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IF YOU CAN'T BEAT 'EM, JOIN 'EM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK'S SCALPING
LAW IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE TICKET BUSINESS
Scott D. Simon*
"[The scalping law] operates alike upon all ticket brokers, who
certainly fall within a reasonably distinguishable class from...
owners and ... promoters for purposes of state regulation."1
"We're trying to legally legitimize the secondary ticket market."
2
"If we win, and I expect we will, I think that many more sports
teams will be doing this.
'
"
3
INTRODUCTION
Many people believe scalpers are the cockroaches of the
entertainment industry: They were there at the beginning and they'll
be there at the end, hawking front-row seats to the Apocalypse.
Those waiting on long lines to purchase tickets for a popular show are
often the most frustrated with the scalping industry's drive for profits,
observing that those who work for scalpers are "not exactly the
greatest theater enthusiasts."4 If a local sports team is in the playoffs,
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. My thanks to Professor
Peter Siegelman for his enthusiasm for law and economics. A thank you is also due
Seth Burn for his criticisms, some of which I agree with. I am especially grateful to
my parents and grandparents, whose support and encouragement has motivated me
throughout my education, and to Michelle, #1 nudge and world's greatest wife.
1. Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Kaufman, J.).
2. Statement of Dave Scarborough, Vice President of Technology, Ticketmaster,
in Jennifer Mulrean, Ticket Scalping Goes Mainstream (Sept. 16, 2003), at
http://money.msn.com/content/Savinganddebt/Finddealsonline/ P58727.asp. Mr.
Scarborough described his company's latest business plan, which includes both
primary market and peer-to-peer auctions, to a financial reporter. Id.; see infra notes
253-58 and accompanying text.
3. James Klenk, Attorney for the Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field Premium
Ticket Services, in Darren Rovell, Brokerage Won't Capitalize on Cubs' Run (Oct. 7,
2003), at http://sports.espn.go.com/ mlb/playoffs2003/news/story?id=1632772. Mr.
Klenk, the attorney in a class-action lawsuit filed by the team's fans, spoke on behalf
of the team. Id.; see infra notes 201-29 and accompanying text.
4. See Jesse McKinley, For 'The Producers,' Another Box Office Bonanza, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 2003, at B1 (describing how the box office for The Producers took in
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the media blitz over ticket scalping becomes, like the weather report,
a standard part of the news.5 On any given day, a Google News
search6 will turn up dozens of articles on scalping, most of which
report that a hot event quickly sold out at the box office, many people
still want to attend, and buying from scalpers may be the only way to
get a seat.7 The secondary ticket market is huge-one estimate based
on census data pegs revenues between $20 billion and $38 billion a
year'-dwarfing the approximately $4 billion a year in profits
Ticketmaster earns as the world's largest primary ticket seller.'
The word "scalper" was first used in the late nineteenth century to
refer to those who resold the unused portions of long-distance
railroad tickets.I" Today, scalpers are people who resell tickets
outside venues on the day of an event. In contrast to scalpers, "ticket
brokers" appeared in the early 1900s as remote sales outlets for
theaters and ballparks, providing patrons with a convenient
alternative to traveling across town to buy seats in advance.11 Venues
and brokers worked together to maximize sales, with brokers
returning unsold tickets to the box office and rendering payment for
tickets sold. 2 When computers paved the way for corporations such
nearly $3.5 million the day tickets went on sale for a return engagement of the
musical's original stars, a figure aided by the purchases of tickets by scalpers).
5. The 2003 World Series featured the New York Yankees and Florida Marlins.
Tickets for these games ranked among the most expensive items in sports history. See
Todd Venezia & Lorena Mongelli, Game 6 Tix: $4,300, N.Y. Post, Oct. 24, 2003, at 7.
6. Google News is a website that presents information culled from
approximately 4,500 news sources worldwide. The articles are compiled solely by
computer algorithm without human intervention. Today's search on ticket scalping is
available at http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&edition= us&q=ticket+scalping.
7. See, e.g., Gina Goodhill, Sellout Makes UCLA Ticket Scalping Likely, Daily
Trojan, Nov. 7, 2003, at 1. The article describes how the recent success of the USC
and UCLA football teams made the game-one which regularly sells out-more
likely to have tickets resold on the secondary market, especially by USC students who
value more the potential money from selling their student tickets than they do
attending the game. This was one of 56 articles Google News found that day alone.
8. See Elliot Zaret, Will the Net End Ticket Scalping? (Sept. 2, 1999), at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-501311.html. This MSNBC article, which focuses on
how the Internet will change, not end, scalping, quotes Arizona State University
economist Stephen Happel, whose estimate as to the size of the secondary ticket
market considers the combined scalping and brokering industry. Id.
9. See Ticketmaster, About Us, at http://www.ticketmaster.com/
h/aboutus.html?tmlink=tm home_i-abouttm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
10. See 14 Oxford English Dictionary 568 (2d ed. 1989); see also Pascal Courty,
Some Economics of Ticket Resale, 17 J. Econ. Persps. 85, 88 (2003).
11. See National Association of Ticket Brokers, What is a Ticket Broker?, at
http://www.natb.org/ticketbroker/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). The National
Association of Ticket Brokers is an industry trade group formed in 1994 as a
concerted effort to set rigid ethical standards for the ticket brokerage industry, to
educate the public about the business of selling tickets on the secondary market, and
to encourage ticket brokers to get bonded to ensure consumer refunds.
12. Id.
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as Ticketron and Ticketmaster to serve several markets
simultaneously, local brokers moved into the secondary market,
providing premium tickets to sold-out events and serving as an outlet
for ticket holders to sell seats to events they could not or did not want
to attend. 3 Some see the price markups imposed by ticket scalpers
14
as free-market capitalism in action because they facilitate transactions
between willing buyers and sellers. Others, however, consider it "un-
American" because they believe scalpers steal profits from promoters
and force fans to pay unnecessarily high prices for tickets. 5
Regardless of one's individual viewpoint, however, scalping is against
the law in New York.
Scalping is defined by section 25 of the New York Arts and Cultural
Affairs Law ("NY ACAL"), which provides in part,
1. No person, firm or corporation shall resell or engage in the
business of reselling any tickets of admission or any other evidence
of the right of entry to a theatre, place of amusement or
entertainment, or other places where public exhibitions, games,
contests or performances are held, or own, conduct or maintain any
office, branch office, bureau, agency or sub-agency for such business
without having first procured a license.., granted upon the
payment by or on behalf of the applicant of a fee of two hundred
dollars... 2. This section shall not apply to any person, firm or
corporation which purchases any tickets as defined in this section
with the intent of using the tickets solely for their own use or the use
of their invitees, employees and agents and resells them at a price
not in excess of that permitted by section 25.13 of this article should
they no longer be able to use them.' 6
Ticket resale is thereby regulated in New York, excluding from
prosecution those without licenses who need to resell tickets they
cannot use, but forbidding resale for prices over the amount set by
law.
The stated purpose of New York's legislature in controlling the sale
of tickets to theaters or places of entertainment is to "safeguard[] the
public against fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and similar abuses."17
13. Id.
14. This Note uses the colloquial "scalpers" to refer to both scalpers and brokers
because from an economic perspective, both groups provide similar services. See
Pascal Courty, An Economic Guide to Ticket Pricing in the Entertainment Industry, 66
Louvain Econ. Rev. 167, 174 (2000).
15. See Associated Press, Is Minnesota's Scalping Law Out of Date? (Nov. 2, 2003)
(explaining that ticket scalping should not be criminalized because, "in 2003,
nationwide ticket buying and selling is as modern as eBay, as easy as the click of your
mouse and as secure as Internet banking"), at
http://wcco.com/localnews/local-story-306224722.html.
16. N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.03 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2004).
17. N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.01 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2004). The full
section reads:
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To put it plainly, ticket scalping is prohibited because scalpers
allegedly gouge helpless consumers by charging several times the face
value18 for tickets that scalpers preemptively remove from the public
market or blatantly counterfeit. This Note demonstrates that the
premises on which the legislature based the law are flawed because,
contrary to popular belief, scalpers do not corner the ticket market for
sold out events, nor do they price gouge or engage in extortionate
pricing. Moreover, this Note also shows that the court-created
justification for the law fails even when taken on its own terms: The
rationale cited to uphold the law cannot be sustained in light of recent
developments in the sports and entertainment industries, including
promoters' appropriation of the supposedly "unethical" business
practices of scalpers, which are unquestionably illegal under the
current regime when perpetrated by scalpers.
Part I of this Note provides background about the secondary ticket
market by presenting an economic analysis of ticket scalping,
examining the reasons the resale business thrives despite the
legislature's finding that scalping is dangerous and harmful to the
public.
Part II outlines developments in the sports and entertainment
industries that evince the paradigm shift in the ticket business that this
Note argues necessitates revision of existing laws. Part II.A.
It is hereby determined and declared that the price of or charge for
admission to theatres, places of amusement or entertainment, or
other places where public exhibitions, games, contests or
performances are held is a matter affected with a public interest and
subject to the supervision of the appropriate political subdivisions of
the state for the purpose of safeguarding the public against fraud,
extortion, exorbitant rates and similar abuses.
Id.
18. New York law requires prices to be printed on all tickets and defines the
maximum price resellers may obtain:
Every person, firm or corporation who owns, operates or controls a
theatre, place of amusement or entertainment, or other place where
public exhibitions, games, contests or performances are held shall, if
a price be charged for admission thereto, print on the face of each
such ticket or other evidence of the right of entry the price charged
therefor by such person, firm or corporation. Such person, firm or
corporation shall likewise be required to print or endorse thereon the
maximum premium (not to exceed two dollars, plus lawful taxes), at
which such ticket or other evidence of the right of entry may be
resold or offered for resale. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm
or corporation to resell or offer to resell such ticket or other evidence
of the right of entry at any premium or price in excess of such
maximum premium printed or endorsed thereon, plus lawful taxes,
or so that the ultimate price to the purchaser of such ticket shall
exceed a sum in excess of two dollars over and above the original
price charged for admission as printed on the face of each such ticket
or other evidence of the right of entry, plus lawful taxes.
N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.13.
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chronicles the history of scalping cases in New York by focusing on
five prominent cases, from the first review of the law in 1924, which
struck it down, to more recent failed constitutional challenges to New
York's scalping law.19 Part II.B. describes promoters' efforts to make
as much money selling tickets as possible by entering into territory
previously inhabited only by scalpers. These tactics include holding
back tickets until the day of the event, operating on the secondary
market, and outright price discrimination.
Part III explains how the constitutional basis for upholding the New
York law has significantly eroded such that courts should strike down
the scalping prohibition. This Note argues that, far from posing a
threat to society, the existence of the secondary ticket market benefits
consumers and does not harm promoters. The due process argument
for sustaining the law employed by New York courts, analyzed in Part
III.A., does not withstand a microeconomic study of the secondary
ticket market. Because consumers are not being defrauded or
extorted into paying exorbitant rates, the disconnect between the facts
and the legislature's rationale points to a failure of the rational
relationship test and a lack of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Courts addressing the issue have deferred to the
judgment of New York's legislature, which identified scalping as a
problem and enacted a law to eliminate it. This Note argues that it is
not New York's remedy that curtails due process, but the legislature's
unreasonable finding that scalping is a harm to consumers in the first
place that makes the law unconstitutional.
An even stronger argument is made in Part III.B. that New York's
scalping law fails an equal protection analysis. Courts' distinction
between resellers and original sellers is breaking down because
promoters are charging market rates for their best tickets-prices that
when obtained by brokers are condemned as extortionate. Promoters
are also reselling tickets on the secondary market, mimicking the
business practices of scalpers. Additionally, promoters are
implementing auction systems by which the best seats will first be sold
at the price the highest bidder is willing to pay. The consequences of
this type of price discrimination-namely that individuals who pay the
most are the ones who end up with tickets-is most often the focal
point of anti-scalping campaigns. Because courts consider these
business methods legitimate when practiced by original sellers but
illegal when practiced by scalpers, the law is discriminatory and
therefore unconstitutional.
19. People v. Rosenblatt, 717 N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 2000), which challenged the
constitutionality of New York's scalping law, is not included in this analysis. In that
case, the court held, without elucidation, that "[t]he maximum ticket price
restrictions.., are not unconstitutional," citing the 1964 and 1995 cases this Note
describes in detail infra Part II.A. Id. at 10.
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Part III.C. concludes with a look at the consequences of accepting
this Note's proposal of striking down section 25 of the NY ACAL:
Promoters will be forced to confront a free ticket market and the New
York legislature may pass a new law addressing those harms that may
arise from legalized scalping.
I. ECONOMICS OF THE SECONDARY TICKET MARKET
This section reviews the extensive literature on how the illegal
activity of scalping persists despite fifty years of legislative effort to
eradicate it, examining the uniqueness of the ticket industry,
promoters' pricing structure, and ticket distribution practices. The
work of researchers John Tishler" and Pascal Courty,2" among others,
has clearly framed the issue.
A. Opportunity for Scalping
Traditionally, the entertainment and sports industries have set their
ticket prices far below market value.2 Basic microeconomic theory
posits that when sellers offer goods at lower prices, demand will be
higher and more goods will be sold.23 For many consumers, the
admission price they would be willing to pay is much greater than that
charged by the box office, resulting in a shortage of tickets, more
commonly referred to as an event being sold out. Those who are able
to buy from the box office24 receive consumer surplus, the positive
difference between what they would have paid for the ticket and the
price that the box office charged. When the ticket is worth less to its
owner than to some other consumer, reselling will benefit both parties
because sellers have received more consideration than they would
have accepted and buyers have received tickets that they value more
than the consideration paid. 6 Without obstacles to this process, a
series of bargains will be struck until all tickets are in the hands of the
20. See John D. Tishler, Ticket Scalping: An Economic Analysis and Proposed
Solution, 33 Santa Clara L. Rev. 91 (1993). The structure of Part I is drawn from
Tishler's excellent article.
21. See Courty, supra note 10, at 85; supra note 14, at 174.
22. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Zankel, Comment, Wanted: Tickets-A Reassessment of
Current Ticket Scalping Legislation and the Controversy Surrounding Its Enforcement,
2 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 129, 144-47 (1992) (criticizing per se regulation of scalping
because consumers are both victims and beneficiaries of the practice).
23. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 31 (3d ed. 2000).
24. Consumers' ability to purchase tickets at box office prices is discussed infra
Part I.D.
25. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 95. Although not a tangible commodity,
consumer surplus is the reason the resale market exists. Both promoters and scalpers
constantly strive to capture this surplus for themselves, while consumers themselves
intrinsically feel entitled to it.
26. See Courty, supra note 14, at 185.
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highest-valuing users. 2' Historically, however, the costs inherent in
these transactions stem from the difficulty buyers and sellers have
finding each other.28 Scalpers enter the market as middlemen
between the low-valuing ticket holder 29 and the high-valuing buyer,
taking as profit a part of the consumer surplus created.3"
B. Uniqueness of the Ticket Market
Entertainment tickets do not conform to economists' generic
"widget" model of goods manufactured for sale, placed on retail
shelves, and sold at uniform prices.31 This dissimilarity is because
tickets, unlike #2 Kansas Red Wheat, are heterogeneous commodities
that generate diverse levels of demand based on different events'
popularity, date, seat location, and myriad other factors. Also, unlike
thickly traded goods, tickets ordinarily represent a tiny part of a
promoter's cost equation because the only expenses associated with
filling an otherwise empty seat are the security and clean-up costs that
are not dependent on the attendance of one additional fan.32 Once a
venue sells out, however, a promoter's costs associated with adding
one additional seat are impracticably high, as that addition would
require moving the event to a larger venue or scheduling an extra
show. 3 As most ticketed events are scheduled and sold well in
advance of their performance date, switching venues would
inconvenience fans as well as promoters. Sports events are even more
rarely moved because teams have fields at which all their home games
are played and because one team's schedule is dependent on that of
all other teams in the same league. The supply of tickets to any given
event, therefore, is limited by the size of the facility.34 For example,
27. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1
(1960). Coase won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991 "for his discovery and
clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the
institutional structure and functioning of the economy." See Nobel e-Museum, at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
28. Transaction costs have recently declined for computer users with the
ascension of eBay, an online marketplace where sellers advertise the availability of
tickets and potential buyers bid on them, auction-style. See Jon Michael Gibbs,
Cyperscalping: On-Line Ticket Sales, 31 U. Tol. L. Rev. 471, 485 (2000). Although
eBay may facilitate more transactions, the limited supply of tickets to any given event
will keep prices and transaction costs high.
29. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 96. Tishler believes that scalpers obtain most of
their inventory from the box office. Why box office prices for tickets are set far below
the market clearing price is discussed infra Part I.C.
30. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 96.
31. See Courty, supra note 14, at 167 (discussing the ticket market as "a unique
laboratory experiment").
32. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 96.
33. Id. at 96-97. Tishler notes that this is "generally impossible for sporting events
and often impracticable for other performances." Id. at 97 n.45.
34. See id. at 97.
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Madison Square Garden has a fixed capacity of 19,763. 3" Economists
call this a perfectly inelastic supply.3 6 When supply is inelastic,
demand sets the price.37 Consumers perceive price increases based on
promoters' increases in cost as fair, but consider those based on
demand unfair. 8 Thus high-valuing consumers, who readily pay the
market price of a ticket (which depends on demand), may consider
themselves victims rather than equal participants in a market
transaction even though they received the full benefit of the bargain.
A second unique characteristic of the entertainment ticket market
is that promoters are not depending solely on single-event ticket sales
for their profit. They are promoting more than just a solitary concert
or sporting event-they want fans to become regulars at their concerts
or games to ensure recurring profits.3 9 Furthermore, promoters'
ancillary revenue streams, such as souvenirs, concessions, broadcast
rights and parking should also be considered part of the ticket-pricing
equation.4" For instance, promoters earn more from expensive soda,
hot dogs, and beer than they do from tickets." Because
entertainment tickets are not the same as standard retail goods,
promoters are likely to price and sell them differently as well.
C. The Underpricing of Tickets
Demand exceeds supply for tickets to certain events because of the
pricing policies implemented by promoters of events for which tickets
are scalped.42 Two theories of underpricing in the entertainment
industry, as well as the case of the movie theater industry, are
examined below. Tishler provided the "textbook analysis"43 of this
35. See The Official Website of the New York Knicks: Arena and Tickets, at
http://www.nba.com/knicks/tickets/arena.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
36. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 23, at 25-26.
37. See id.
38. See Brian M. Pukier, Exiled on Main Street. A Ticket Scalper's Dilemma, 50 U.
Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 280, 292 (1992) (citing D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch & R. Thaler,
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am. Econ.
Rev. 728 (1986)). Pukier's study of the Canadian ticket market demonstrates that
scalping is an international phenomenon. He concludes that Canada's scalping
legislation is "invariably overbroad" such that the government should be "getting out
of the ticket game." Id. at 300.
39. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 97.
40. See id.
41. See Team Marketing Report, Fan Cost Index: Major League Baseball, at
http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm?page=fci_mlb2003.cfm (last visited Jan. 25,
2004). The Fan Cost Index tracks the cost of attendance for a family of four,
including tickets, parking, souvenirs, and concessions. In 2003, the average cost of
concessions and parking at a Major League Baseball game, as researched by Team
Marketing Report, was more than double the cost of an average ticket. Id.
42. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 98.
43. See Courty, Economics, supra note 10, at 85. "The textbook analysis of resale
typically takes for granted that promoters deliberately choose to underprice and that
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phenomenon, describing several reasons promoters underprice tickets
and declaring that promoters keep ticket prices low to engender
goodwill with patrons." Courty contrasted the entertainment
business with that of airlines, concluding that scalping of sports and
concert tickets is inevitable given promoters' difficulty with
preventing resale and their inability to price tickets for buyers in both
the early and late markets.45 Einav and Orbach assessed movie
theaters' pricing schemes and presented motives similar to those
proposed by Tishler but were not convinced by any of them, leaving
open the question of why rational theater owners would abandon
easily attainable profits.46 This part addresses each of these models in
turn.
1. Tishler's Textbook Analysis of Promoter Underpricing
It may come as a surprise that the business decisions of promoters
create the scalping market.4" Promoters' pricing motives include, but
are not limited to, any one of the following explanations.4 8  First,
because tickets are sold weeks or months in advance of an event,
setting prices lower than market clearing levels may be due to
promoters' mistaken belief as to the ultimate demand for a specific
event.49 Promoters who believe that an event will be unpopular will
set prices low so as to stimulate demand. However, if the promoter is
proven wrong and the event turns out to be very popular, as with a
new band with a hit single or a sports team that is unexpectedly in first
place, consumers will buy tickets at the low price even though they
would have been willing to pay more.
Tickets may also be underpriced because promoters are unable to
perfectly price differentiate:" Even though front row tickets often
cost several times as much as "nosebleed seats," promoters may not
set any price difference between front row center and the very last
row of floor seating even though those tickets have vastly different
values to consumers. Seats within the same section could have higher
values than others because they are closer to the field or the stage.
Some seats could be valued lower than others because the view is
this opens the door for arbitrages." Id.
44. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 102.
45. See Courty, supra note 10, at 92-94.
46. See Liran Einav & Barak Y. Orbach, Uniform Prices for Differentiated Goods:
The Case of the Movie-Theater Industry (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/papers/pdf/337.pdf.
47. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, Assessing the Economic
Rationale and Legal Remedies for Ticket Scalping, 16 J. Legis. 1, 7 (1989).
48. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 98.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 99. Courty calls this process "scaling the house." See Courty, supra note
14, at 171.
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obstructed or behind the stage. Tishler wrote that it is impossible for
promoters to determine the market clearing price for each individual
ticket because they have insufficient information about consumer
demand. However, even if promoters had that information, they
would choose not to incur the cost of marketing and distributing
thousands of tickets, each with a different face value, because the
complex process of individually pricing and selling 45,000 different
tickets costs more than promoters could expect to gain from it.
51
A third reason promoters may underprice tickets is to enable
promoter insider-trading,52 the practice of intentionally withholding
the best tickets from public sale so that the promoters themselves can
sell tickets to scalpers at prices above face value53 or give them away
to favored parties. 4 The first practice, known as "ice," is "money
paid, in the form of a gratuity, premium or bribe, in excess of the
printed box office price of a ticket, to an operator of any 'place of
entertainment' or their agent, representative or employee. 5 5 Box
office employees of promoters or Ticketmaster have an opportunity
to take bribes because promoters set ticket prices so far below what
the public is willing to pay. Kandel and Block argue that tickets on
the secondary market are so expensive in large part because scalpers
must cover the increased cost of acquiring tickets by means of "ice."
The second practice, that of denying the public the ability to buy
tickets in favor of giving them away to VIPs, is much more widespread
than the public realizes. 56  In fact, the New York Yankees were
investigated by a New York State lobbying commission for
distributing free tickets to public officials without disclosing the
nature and amount of the gifts,57 and later paid a fine of $75,000.5
Further, when promoters object to scalpers "monopolizing" ticket
purchases, they are certainly not complaining about their own ability
51. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 99.
52. Id. at 100.
53. See generally Andrew Kandel & Elizabeth Block, The "De-Icing" of Ticket
Prices: A Proposal Addressing the Problem of Commercial Bribery in the New York
Ticket Industry, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 489 (1997). The authors describe "ice" as commercial
bribery and recommend that New York State classify the payment and receipt of
"ice" as a felony under the ACAL. Id. at 505-06.
54. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 284. "[W]ell-connected scalpers can obtain
tickets from promoters, artists, and other favoured individuals who have received
tickets that never went on sale to the general public." Id.
55. See Kandel & Block, supra note 53, at 489-90.
56. See, e.g., Cavoto v. Chi, Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., No. 02 CH 18372,
slip op. at 8 (Ill. Ch. Nov. 24, 2003) (describing the regular process of sports teams
holding back tickets for VIPs).
57. See Associated Press, Steinbrenner, Yankees Issued Subpoenas (Dec. 24, 2003),
at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1693880.
58. See Associated Press, Yankees, Lobbying Commission Settle Case (Dec. 31,
2003), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/baseball/mlb/12/31/
bc.bba.yankees.subpoenas.ap.
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to hold back tickets, which the scalping law does not even address. 9
For example, the National Football League holds back 25.2% of
tickets to the Super Bowl,' giving these "house seats" away to people
like politicians, sponsors, and media personalities. Promoters who
provide free seats to VIPs think that making these few people happy
outweighs the small profit gained from selling tickets to fans.
Tishler ultimately argues that promoters underprice tickets to
maximize long-term revenues.6" Their strategy is based on their belief
that consumers see price increases based on boosts in demand as
unfair.62 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, in oft-repeated behavioral
economics studies, found that 82% of survey respondents believed it
"unfair" or "extremely unfair" for a hardware store to raise snow
shovel prices by $5 the morning after a snowstorm.63 The authors'
conclusion, that consumers are more likely to accept price increases
based on recovering economic cost than those based on a free market,
is quite relevant to a discussion of ticket scalping because it implies
that consumers will choose not to transact with promoters who "take
advantage" of them.' Tishler suggested that consumers mistakenly
view the face value of a ticket as representative of promoters' costs, 65
an error implicitly endorsed by state statutes that require prices to be
printed on tickets.66  Therefore, Tishler argues, promoters
intentionally keep prices low, creating consumer goodwill that
increases loyalty, resulting in higher attendance and purchases of the
promoters' related products. 67
2. Comparison to Airline Industry Ticketing Practices
In 2000, Courty reviewed much of the economic and legal research
on pricing policies in the ticket business, in part collecting arguments
59. "Payments of premiums to individuals other than agents of the venue (such as
promoters and house seat holders) are not specifically covered by ACAL, but can be
covered by other provisions of the criminal law, such as commercial bribery." See
Bureau of Investor Protection and Securities, Why Can't I Get Tickets? Report on
Ticket Distribution Practices (May 27, 1999), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/scalping/fulltext.html. The report
recommends that the secrecy surrounding current ticket distribution practices be
lifted by legislating increased disclosure as to the availability of tickets to consumers.
Id.
60. See Superbowl.com Special Events Information, at
http://www.superbowl.com/features/general-info (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
61. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 101-02.
62. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 292.
63. Id.
64. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 102.
65. Id. at n.81.
66. See, e.g., N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.13 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2004).
67. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 102.
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on why promoters would intentionally underprice tickets.68 He cited
the popular assumption that promoters, by setting low prices,
guarantee a sellout and a feeling of prestige and validation for those
in attendance.69 Promoters also underprice because they know that
tickets withheld from public sale can be used to grant favors to
selected individuals.7" More insidiously, promoters underprice to
evade taxes: They declare that all tickets were sold to the public at
face value and pay taxes on that revenue, while withholding some
tickets for sale at the higher market price.7t
Three years later Courty appeared to reject the theories of other
researchers when he presented his own hypothesis on scalping. Like
models of airline ticket pricing, Courty's theory of entertainment
ticket resale was based on the premise that "consumers learn new
information about their demands over time. '' 72 He broke down the
hypothetical market into "diehard fans, ' 73 who value the knowledge
that they definitely will attend, and "busy professionals, '74 who only
find out if their schedule is open close to the event date, but who place
a high value on tickets. 75 This state of affairs opens up an opportunity
where scalpers can buy early tickets-priced low enough for diehard
fans-that they resell later to those consumers who eventually find
out that they are eager to attend the event.76 In other words, Courty
believes promoters have to sell tickets in the early market at low
prices to ensure that diehard fans can afford to go. Scalpers then buy
some of the tickets meant for diehard fans and sell them in the late
market to busy professionals, who are willing to pay any price. The
result is that promoters cannot sell high-priced tickets early or they
will dissuade fans from buying, and they cannot beat scalpers' high
prices in the late game because scalpers who bought at the same time
68. See Courty, supra note 14, at 167.
69. Id. at 173. Courty also mentions that consumers are influenced by box office
figures: Broadway shows inflate their attendance numbers as a marketing tool. Id.
70. Id. People who receive tickets from promoters can choose between selling the
tickets or attending the event. Presumably this explanation includes the payment of
"ice.,,
71. See id.
72. See Courty, supra note 10, at 86. He recognizes that the model is limited in
that airlines have control over the transferability of tickets whereas a supposed lack of
feasibility precludes entertainment promoters from checking the identification of
thousands of ticket holders the day of the event. Id. at 89.
73. Id. at 92.
74. Id.
75. Id Compare this situation to the airline industry, in which consumers who
purchase in advance receive the least expensive fare while those who purchase the
day of the flight are charged significantly more for the same class of seat. Although
this pricing model ignores the recent introduction of airline ticket brokers such as
Priceline and Hotwire, it describes the airline ticket-buying process for the vast
majority of passengers.
76. Id. at 92-94.
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as diehard fans will simply undercut whatever price the promoter sets
while still making a profit for themselves.77 In this way scalping is an
unavoidable consequence of the ticket business.
3. Ticketing Practices of the Movie Theater Industry
"Inferior," "inefficient," and "unexplained 7 8 describe the movie
industry's practice of uniform pricing for all films despite significant
variation in their popularity, the day of the week, and the time of the
year.79 Einav and Orbach did not attempt to solve this puzzle; 80 rather
they laid out several possible reasons theater owners engage in this
behavior and refute them all.
The first possible reason movie tickets are underpriced is that
theater owners need regular customers, so it is against owners' best
interest to antagonize consumers with pricing schemes the latter
perceive as unfair.81 Owners believe that variable prices will affect
consumers' loyalty, that the long history of fixed prices is ingrained
into consumers' minds such that this regularity is the fairness
standard. Under this theory, consumers have always paid the same
price for every movie in a theater so a change from that pricing model
would infuriate them. Theater owners are afraid that moviegoers who
believe they have been treated unfairly by a theater that institutes a
variable pricing scheme will substitute the similar experience of
watching a DVD.82 This is because consumers would prefer renting a
movie for viewing on their home theater system to submitting to the
"unfair" practice of variable pricing.
Einav and Orbach respond, however, that the fairness of price
fluctuations in the eyes of consumers depends on how owners frame
them:83 Rather than increasing admission prices for blockbusters,
theater owners could institute a "B-movie" or a "Tuesday" discount
that consumers would embrace. In other words, theaters could set the
"normal" price of a ticket at $15.00 but, like a commuter train's off-
peak fares, could charge $6.50 for unpopular screening times or films.
Furthermore, the authors, citing Kahneman et al.,' argue that
consumers-who often equate fair prices with production costs-
77. Id. at 93.
78. See Einav & Orbach, supra note 46, at Abstract, 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 3-4. The authors focus on why extremely popular films like the Lord of
the Rings trilogy are priced the same as much less popular ones like Stuck On You,
but do not focus on variations in price across theater chains or on discounts for
students and seniors. Id.
81. Id. at 20; see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
82. See Einav & Orbach, supra note 46, at 22.
83. Id. at 23.
84. See id. at 23 n.19; see also Pukier, supra note 38, at 292 n.38.
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would probably accept premiums charged for $100 million
blockbusters." This would simply be another public-relations battle
for promoters. If they announced that their screening costs for a star-
studded extravaganza necessitated a one-dollar surcharge for the
opening weekend, consumers might very well accept it.
Theater owners most often cite the unpredictability of a new film's
demand86 as the reason they refrain from price differentiation.8 7
Einav and Orbach, however, contend that theater owners, by looking
only to the demand for each film, ignored the predictable and regular
patterns of demand for watching movies in the theater, which could
be exploited for profit.88 Since the highest demand occurs during the
weekend and during the summer and holidays, 9 theater owners
should adjust their pricing patterns to earn more money from
consumers who insist on attending during those times. Last, the
authors look at how an agency problem might lead to uniform ticket
pricing practices. Owners receive more of each dollar spent on
concessions than they do on admissions,9" so exhibitors may not have
an interest in maximizing ticket prices.91 In response, Einav and
Orbach assert that consumers have seemingly always complained that
movie ticket prices are too high.92 This observation is relevant
because if theater owners were really interested in getting consumers
in the door to buy snacks, they would lower ticket prices to the point
where movies were universally considered a bargain. Furthermore,
box office revenue remains theaters' major source of income, so it is
in the owners' best interest to "maximize the pie of box-office
revenues as it will allow bigger slices to all" involved.93
4. Critique of Promoter Underpricing Theories
As profit-seekers, promoters should be expected to set ticket prices
at a level that maximizes their revenues. The research reviewed
above explains why promoters ignore the law of supply and demand
to underprice tickets. The remainder of this part critiques those
analyses to provide a framework for use in Parts II and III.
The textbook analysis of ticket underpricing proposed first that
promoters mistakenly underestimate consumer demand, resulting in
85. See Einav & Orbach, supra note 46, at 23-24.
86. Id. at 24-25. Owners would likely be unable to adjust prices once demand was
established due to a movie's short screen life and the above discussion on fairness. Id.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 26. The markup on refreshments is "more than 80%." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 27.
93. Id.
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low prices.94  This underestimation is unlikely because music
promoters are industry insiders who know that, for example, the
Simon and Garfunkel reunion tour will be one of the most popular
concert series of the year and one that would likely sell out at any
price point. Sports promoters similarly know the drawing power of
the teams in their league and that demand increases significantly for
all teams during the playoffs. Thus the "mistake" rationale for
underpricing is unconvincing.
The next reason provided by the textbook analysis is that
promoters are unable to scale the house such that the price of each
seat reflects its value on the market.95  Promoters may have
historically faced technological limitations to marketing and selling
tickets in this fashion,96 but this does not explain why tickets at all
price levels are resold on the secondary market. Consumers who are
willing to pay scalpers a significant premium over box office prices
usually value admission to an event over seat location. These
consumers are unconcerned where they sit as long as they can say "I
was there." Promoters' failure to price differentiate each seat is
therefore not the cause of underpriced tickets.
The practice of holding back tickets to profit from "ice" or to give
tickets away to preferred individuals 97 results in a benefit to
promoters, and withholding tickets to avoid taxes9" could be doubly
profitable, if doubly illegal.99 Still, this custom begs the question:
Why do promoters underprice, holding back certain tickets for sale on
the open market, when they could price all tickets at market clearing
levels and receive market profits on all of them? In other words,
promoters who recognize that there is money to be made by selling
tickets at whatever price the market sets will also recognize that they
should do that for all tickets, not just some of them. It follows that
this irrational behavior could not be the reason promoters underprice
tickets.
The textbook analyst's answer to that question-and to the other
questions dealing with mistake and inability to price differentiate-
lies in promoter goodwill: Promoters intentionally keep prices low to
keep fans coming back."°0 This theory, however, has a fatal flaw.
Promoters contend that consumers view pricing based on demand as
94. See supra text accompanying note 49.
95. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
96. See infra Part III.B.2.-5. for a discussion on why this situation is no longer the
case.
97. See supra notes 52-55, 70 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
99. Tax avoidance is illegal and, in New York, so is the practice of promoters
selling their own tickets for more than face value. See, e.g., N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff.
Law § 25.13 (McKinney 1991) (amend. 2001).
100. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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unfair and would be unwilling to buy from promoters who "take
advantage" of them by charging market rates for admission. 10 1
However, consumers are willing to do just that when they deal with
scalpers. Because reselling underpriced tickets is a successful
industry, goodwill is both an insignificant part of consumers' ticket
purchasing decisions and an insufficient explanation for promoter
underpricing.
Courty wrote that ticket resale is a natural and unavoidable
consequence of market timing; he assumed that promoters must sell
to "diehard fans" who buy tickets early and to "busy professionals"
who buy tickets late because the latter only realize they can attend an
event close to its date. 2 Scalpers buy tickets at the same time as
diehard fans and resell to busy professionals at prices that
professionals are willing to pay but are lower than whatever the
promoter would choose to charge in the late market. 103 In theory, this
model is appealing, but when compared to the real world it is
counterintuitive. A key observation is that for any sold-out event,
there are enough diehard fans to purchase every ticket the promoter
makes available to the public.1" As the "diehard" label should make
clear, these fans value attendance even more than they do planning
and are willing to pay market clearing prices if necessary. True
diehard fans commit in advance to buying a ticket and attending
whether or not they can get tickets from the box office. Thus Courty's
theory is unpersuasive.
Einav and Orbach searched but could not find a reason the movie
theater industry abandoned readily available profits by underpricing
tickets: Consumers' irrational views of fairness could be tempered by
framing variable prices as discounts rather than increases; the
unpredictability of a specific film's popularity was inconsequential
given broader demand patterns; and what seemed like an owner
incentive to maximize concession revenue at the expense of ticket
prices was shown to be a fallacy because tickets are the industry's
primary revenue source.10 5
These findings also apply to the broader ticket business. Sports
promoters could discount ticket prices to reflect the quality of a
weaker opposing team. Music promoters could predict demand based
on factors like radio play and CD sales, with ticket premiums that
"fairly" reflect the artist's popularity and thus the promoter's costs.
Also like the movie industry, tickets are the primary source of
101. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 292.
102. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
104. Engaging in "ice," holding back tickets for VIPs, and season ticket plans all
reduce the box office supply.
105. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
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revenue, so it makes no sense to underprice tickets to benefit
concessions when promoters could charge high ticket prices and still
sell concessions.
Einav and Orbach, by leaving open the question of why promoters
underprice tickets, avoided foreclosing the possibility that promoters
underprice because of poor business decisions. As Part III shows,
theirs was the correct analysis because promoters are wising up so that
a discussion of promoter underpricing will soon be moot.
D. Alternative Distribution Schemes and the Function of the Scalper
Because of promoter underpricing, demand for tickets will outstrip
supply, so the initial distribution must depend on a means other than
price.1"6 Tishler identified three of the most common mechanisms.
1. Queue
Queuing, the British term for waiting in line,"0 7 is the traditional
distribution method for concerts and single-game sporting events. 108
This method involves little cost to promoters, is seen as the most
"fair" method by consumers'019 because social and economic status
plays no part in determining one's place in line, and queuing
transforms the price of the ticket from box office price to face value
plus the cost of waiting in line."0 As to this third feature, a queue
method of distribution favors the less wealthy who place more value
on money than time, as opposed to the more wealthy, who deem time
as more valuable."' When tickets are allocated by queue, the scalper
serves as a middleman in a transaction where wealthy individuals pay
less wealthy individuals to wait on line,1'2 thus "partially restor[ing]
price allocation to a non-price distribution system.""' 3
106. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 103.
107. Id. at 103 n.88.
108. Id. at 103. Aside from the box office at the venue itself, Ticketmaster operates
many remote box offices at locations such as record stores and supermarkets, where
individuals can wait on line. In addition, Ticketmaster has modernized queue
distribution mechanisms by allowing consumers to purchase from Ticketmaster over
the phone or Internet. At the prescribed date and time at which tickets for a given
event go on sale, consumers attempt to "get through" to Ticketmaster by calling a
phone number or visiting the company's website. Due to the limited number of
phone operators and concurrent users supported by Ticketmaster's servers,
consumers often experience delays in connecting-to an operator or to a server-
similar to physically waiting in line and may end up similarly situated to those at the
end of the line: without tickets.
109. There is an equal opportunity for the public to stand in line, yet consumers
still complain when resellers or their agents are waiting alongside them.
110. Id. The transformation does not necessarily result in an increase in ticket
prices, as certain individuals incur no cost from waiting in a line.
111. Id. at 104.
112. The people who wait in line to purchase tickets on behalf of scalpers are called
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2. Lottery
Another standard mechanism for distributing underpriced tickets is
a lottery."' The Super Bowl, the NCAA basketball tournaments, and
many music artists' fan clubs use lotteries. These involve low
administrative costs for promoters, are not tied to wealth, and do not
cost consumers the time value of waiting in line."5 Again, scalpers
who obtain tickets, whether by paying lottery winners"' or by hiring
"lottery diggers"T--7-those who enter the lottery for the sole purpose
of selling their tickets to scalpers-will "restor[e] price allocation
amongst consumers."1 18
3. Merit
Promoters sometimes distribute tickets based on their own
specialized criteria." 9 The most familiar of these are season tickets.1 21
Season tickets are an agreement between a promoter and a consumer
whereby the promoter reserves certain seats for the consumer for an
entire season, conditioned on the consumer's willingness to prepay for
the entire season's worth of games. Season ticket holders rarely
receive a volume discount for purchasing what can amount to multiple
tickets for over 80 games each year. This becomes a merit method of
distributing tickets because consumers who have purchased season
tickets one season are permitted to renew those tickets before they
are released to the general public.121 Season tickets, especially for
football teams, can only be obtained by placing one's name at the
bottom of a long waiting list. 22 Long-time season ticket holders will
periodically be able to renew for better seats when others fail to
renew. Further, season ticket holders for a season in which a team
"diggers." See Lawrence Bershad & Richard J. Ensor, Ticket Scalping Legislation-A
New Jersey Case Study, 9 Seton Hall Legis. J. 81, 82-83 (1985) (describing the effects
of state anti-scalping legislation where previously none existed, and concluding that
New Jersey's law is not sufficiently effective at curtailing the problems associated with
scalping). "Diggers" use Ticketmaster's phone and Internet ordering system as well.
113. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 105.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 106 n.110. In fact, because the cost of entering a lottery is small
compared to that of waiting in line, in theory every eligible person would enter a
lottery for underpriced goods solely for the purpose of resale. Id.
116. The endowment effect, by which people sometimes demand more to sell
something that they possess than they would be willing to pay to buy it, dictates that
scalpers who try to purchase tickets from lottery winners will have to pay a premium.
See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 23, at 87; see also Tishler, supra note 20, at 106.
117. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 106.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 106-07.
120. Id. at 107.
121. See id.
122. Id.
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makes the playoffs are granted the opportunity to purchase playoff
tickets before the general public. Scalpers may be season ticket
holders themselves. But, much more often, scalpers develop "an
intricate network of season ticket holders who pass tickets which they
cannot use onto the ticket scalper. The season ticket holder usually
receives the face value of the ticket from the scalper, who in turn
resells it for a profit.' 1 23 Thus scalpers' main source of supply for
sports tickets are season ticket holders, not the box office.
II. THE CONFLICT OVER SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE
A. Judicial Response to Scalping Legislation
Part I discussed the New York ticket scalping law as well as the
economics of secondary ticket markets. This part describes courts'
interpretation of section 25 of NY ACAL and its predecessors.
1. Weller: The Supreme Court's First Look at Scalping
The validity of the New York scalping law 124 was first brought
before the United States Supreme Court in Weller v. New York,
125
where a broker convicted of reselling tickets without a license
challenged that provision of the law. 26  The New York Court of
Appeals held below that "[s]uch restrictions interfere with the liberty
of those desiring to engage in that business and are lawful only if
imposed by the legislature in the exercise of what has come to be
described as the 'police power.' ' 127 In its determination of whether
ticket resale was subject to State regulation, the Court of Appeals
found that the legislature's goal to protect the public from extortion
and similar abuses was open to interpretation:
The declaration of the legislature that the price or charge for
admission is a matter affected with the public interest is not
conclusive upon the courts; for the courts must in each case decide
whether in fact the public interest justifies an attempted restriction
by the state upon the liberty of its citizens. Not the assertion of the
legislature but only the actual existence of conditions which would
justify the exercise of legislative control, must be the basis of a valid
exercise of the police power.128
The Court of Appeals examined the legislature's assertions and
123. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 281.
124. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 167-69k (McKinney 1922) (repealed 1983).
125. 268 U.S. 319 (1925).
126. People v. Weller, 143 N.E. 205,206 (N.Y. 1924).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 207.
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held that the legislature could "remedy the abuse of 'extortion' by
price regulation": 129 Promoters had the right to forbid resale as part
of their contract of sale, but, because promoters could not control
scalping behavior by contract or condition,13 ° the legislature was
justified in enacting the law. Although the Court of Appeals left open
the question of whether the legislature could validly restrain prices,
the court upheld the petitioner's conviction for selling without a
license."'
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the broker argued that
the provisions requiring a license and creating a maximum resale price
were inseparable; that those which limit resale were invalid; and
therefore the whole law should fail. 32  Justice McReynolds in
response cited section 174 of the law, which stated that if any part of
the law were judicially determined unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions of the law would remain valid and in effect.' 33 Because
eliminating the provision restricting resale prices could be removed
without creating an unworkable plan, the section requiring a license
was severable and valid, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals
was affirmed.3 4
2. Tyson:35 The Supreme Court Holds Maximum Resale Price
Provisions Unconstitutional
Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton,
which reached the Supreme Court three years after Weller, was
brought against the New York District Attorney by a ticket broker
who sold approximately 300,000 tickets annually. The broker sought
a judicial declaration that the provision of the scalping law regulating
prices was unconstitutional. 136  The broker had obtained a license
under Weller and had provided a bond of $1,000 as required by law to
ensure that he would not engage in fraud or extortion.137 Because he
had acquired a license and posted a bond, the broker argued, any
further regulation was an invalid restriction of individuals' right to
contract.'38 The case had been heard below, where the broker's plea
for a temporary injunction had been denied.'39
129. Id. at 208.
130. Id. at 209.
131. Id. at 209-10.
132. See Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319,325 (1925).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927).
136. See id. at 426-27
137. See id.
138. Id. at 428.
139. Id.
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The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the state's police
power to regulate the conduct of a business or to restrict dealings in
private property existed "only where the business or the property
involved has become 'affected with a public interest.', 14' Businesses
clothed with a public interest, the Court wrote, fall into one of three
classes: those which expressly or impliedly have a duty to render
public service (railroads and public utilities); those "exceptional"
occupations that have always served the public (innkeepers and cab
drivers); and "businesses which though not public at their
inception.., have risen to be such" by devoting the business to the
public use.14 1 The resale of tickets, if it could be characterized as
affected with a public interest, must be the third type.'42 Businesses
found to be of this third type included insurance companies, telegraph
companies, and the operators of a major cross-country grain transfer
station, all of which should be distinguished from ordinary private
business. 143 The phrase "affected with a public interest," the Court
wrote, was not intended to include private undertakings like those
now under consideration. 44
Distinguishing private ticket resale from the other businesses held
to be affected with a public interest was not difficult for the Supreme
Court. First, a theater's relation to the public differs "obviously and
widely, both in character and degree, from a grain elevator, standing
at the gateway of commerce and exacting toll."'1 45  Second, the
importance of theater tickets as amusement falls far below that of
food and shelter, yet the legislature did not have the power to fix the
prices for food or clothing, nor the rental prices for houses or
apartments. 146  Finally, the Court held that theater tickets may be
made revocable or nontransferable by the promoter, obviating the
need for State legislation. 147 If people did not want to adhere to such
contracts, they could simply "stay away. ' 148
Despite the District Attorney's argument that the law was designed
to prevent fraud, extortion, and the like, the Supreme Court held that
the law unjustly encroached on private activity and thus was a
''serious invasion of the rights of property and the freedom of
contract.' ' 49 As an example of effective legislation, the Court cited an
Illinois statute, which required that a price be printed on each ticket
140. Id. at 430 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,126 (1876)).
141. Id. at 431-32.
142. Id at 432.
143. Id. at 432-37.
144. Id. at 438.
145. Id. at 439.
146. Id. at 440.
147. Id. at 440-41.
148. Id. at 442.
149. Id. at 431.
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and that promoters not charge more than that face value for the
ticket, but did not forbid the resale of the ticket by its purchaser for
any price, nor did it forbid the promoter from setting the face value at
any price. 5° The Court concluded that legislatures should "define and
penalize in specific terms" those fraudulent practices by which
promoters and scalpers compel a portion of the public to pay a
different price from others. 5'
Tyson represented the Lochner-era 5 2 Supreme Court's practice of
laissez-faire constitutionalism, of overturning progressive legislation
when it interfered with the natural laws of economics."' Here the
legislation in question violated the broadly interpreted right to
contract and was hence struck down as invalid.154
Despite the Tyson majority's accurate understanding of the
economics of the secondary ticket market, the dissenting opinions had
more influence on future ticket scalping cases. Justice Holmes wrote
that a state legislature should be permitted to do "whatever it sees fit
to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the
Constitution," when it has sufficient force of public opinion behind
it. 55 Although Holmes wrote that "I am far from saying that I think
this particular law a wise and rational provision," he believed that if
the people of New York, speaking through their legislature, said they
wanted the law, the Supreme Court should not act to stop them. 15 6 In
another dissent, Justice Stone wrote that the law was constitutional
because it was, like the grain elevator analogy used by the Court,157
designed to protect consumers from extortionate prices made possible
by the strategic position of middlemen intervening between producer
150. Id. at 443-44.
151. Id. at 445.
152. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
153. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and
Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional
Property, 112 Yale L.J. 2331 (2003).
154. Note, however, that from a purely economic perspective the Tyson decision
was correct. In dicta, Justice Sutherland wrote:
It is urged that the statutory provision under review may be upheld
as an appropriate method of preventing fraud, extortion, collusive
arrangements between the management and those engaged in
reselling tickets, and the like.... [The statute] applies wholly
irrespective of the existence of fraud, collusion or extortion (if that
word can have any legal significance as applied to transactions of the
kind here dealt with...).
Tyson, 273 U.S. at 442-43 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, the Supreme
Court recognized that consumers who buy from scalpers receive exactly what they
bargain for, so there is no sound economic reason to enact a law that forbids the
practice.
155. Id. at 446 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 447.
157. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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and consumer.158 According to Stone, because promoters and scalpers
worked together to create a monopoly in scalpers of the best tickets,
scalpers made exorbitant profits beyond reasonable prices that could
be regulated by the legislature. 5 9
3. Kelly-Sullivan:16° The Supreme Court Defers to State Legislators,
Upholding Scalping Laws
The procedural posture of Kelly-Sullivan v. Moss mirrored that of
Tyson, as a group of ticket brokers filed for injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment that the portion of New York's General
Business Law that limited the maximum premium for resale of tickets
to seventy-five cents was "unreasonable, confiscatory and
discriminatory."' 6' The petitioners argued that an equal protection
violation existed because the law failed to distinguish between high-
and low-priced tickets, as well as between theater tickets and sports
tickets.162
In the sixteen years between Tyson and Kelly-Sullivan, the
Supreme Court had formally adopted the view toward state power
espoused by the Tyson dissents in Nebbia v. New York. 163 That case,
in which a retailer was convicted of violating an order of the New
York Milk Control Board fixing the selling price of milk, rejected the
"affected with a public interest" test once and for all. Nebbia
symbolized a new era for state legislatures, holding that the
Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage
in business as one pleases, and permitting states to prescribe the terms
upon which certain businesses may contract. 164 Further, with Nebbia,
the Supreme Court would take a hands-off approach to state
legislation, holding that the need, appropriateness or wisdom of a
measure is a matter purely of legislative concern. Courts' subsequent
deference to legislatures has resulted in few successful due process
challenges to existing laws.
Given the Supreme Court's new attitude toward state legislation,
the Kelly-Sullivan court turned to the test established in Nebbia, that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained, 165 otherwise known as the rational basis or rational
158. Tyson, 273 U.S. at 449-50.
159. Id. at 450-52.
160. 39 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1943).
161. Id. at 800.
162. Id.
163. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
164. Id. at 527-28.
165. Id. at 525.
2004] 1193
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
relationship test. The court found that the New York legislature had
sound reasons for distinguishing between scalpers and promoters,
including "the hazards of highly competitive enterprise and the need
for large capital investment."166 Furthermore, in response to the
broker's argument that tickets are a luxury for which interested
parties willingly pay, the court held that because the legislature
deemed the law compatible with the public welfare, courts should not
intervene. 67
4. Gold:168 A New York Court Holds Scalping Laws Constitutional
Under the Rational Relation Test
More than twenty years after Kelly-Sullivan, New York had revised
the scalping statute so as to prohibit ticket resale for more than two
dollars over face value.1 69 In Gold v. DiCarlo, a class of licensed ticket
brokers again brought suit challenging the law on due process and
equal protection grounds. The petitioners, despite the ruling in Kelly-
Sullivan, were counting on the fact that Tyson had never been
explicitly overruled. 17° The District Court held, however, that Tyson
was no longer controlling and should be regarded as "a relic for the
constitutional historians, ' 171 going so far as to call it an "antiquated,
legally unsound decision. "172 The court cited Stone's Tyson dissent for
the premise that the "affected with a public interest" test was
illusory,173 as well as Holmes's dissent for the argument that the
legislature may regulate any business when sufficient public opinion
stood behind it.174
The Court then analyzed whether the law was constitutional,
examining whether the method of regulation bore a rational relation
to a constitutionally permissible objective or whether it was arbitrary
and discriminatory. 75  The court thus denied the due process
challenge, holding that the law reflected the legitimate concern of the
legislature with prices the public should pay for theater tickets, absent
fraudulent manipulations. 76 Therefore, even though the legislative
solution to ticket scalping, "may not entirely eliminate the grave
166. Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. Moss, 39 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (App. Div. 1943).
167. Id.
168. 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
169. The statute has since been amended, setting the maximum premium price at
twenty percent over face value. See N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.13 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 2004)
170. See Gold, 235 F. Supp. at 819.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 820.
173. Id. at 819.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 820.
176. Id.
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abuses and may not be the perfect remedy, [it] cannot be faulted as
unreasonable., 177  The Court also rejected the equal protection
challenge.'78 Recall the passage that began this Note: "[The scalping
law] operates alike upon all ticket brokers, who certainly fall within a
reasonably distinguishable class from theatre owners and boxing
promoters for purposes of state regulation." 17 9 The Court's method of
distinguishing ticket brokers from promoters hearkened back to
Kelly-Sullivan and included "the competitive hazards of running a
theatre, producing shows, and making large capital investments.' 180
The Gold court acknowledged that "brokers play a vital role in the
entertainment industry, for they.., bring to the industry the bulk of
its profits,"'' so the scalping law "may not be the perfect remedy" but
neither was it unreasonable. 182
5. Concert Connection:83 Modern Scalping Jurisprudence Relies on a
1964 Holding
Gold v. DiCarlo represented the last constitutional challenge to the
New York scalping law for an entire generation. 1995's People v.
Concert Connection was an appeal of a criminal action brought under
section 25.01 of NY ACAL against a Connecticut ticket broker doing
business in New York State."8 The judge below found no triable
issues of fact and enjoined the broker from further violating the New
York ticket scalping law.185 In addition, Concert Connection was
ordered to pay restitution to injured consumers-those who had paid
more than the legal maximum price of ten percent over face value-
after finding that Concert Connection had on at least three occasions
resold tickets in violation of section 25 of NY ACAL. 8 6 On appeal,
the broker, like the petitioners in Gold, challenged the scalping law on
due process and equal protection grounds, using the Tyson holding
that the price at which tickets are resold is not a matter affected with a
public interest and therefore is an unauthorized use of the State's
police power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 87
Addressing the due process claim, the Appellate Division cited
Gold for the premise that under the rational relationship test, which
177. Id. at 821.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 629 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1995).
184. Id. at 255-56.
185. Id. at 256.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 258.
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carries a strong presumption of constitutionality,188 the New York
statute was valid: "Applying the rational relationship test, the court
found that, while the statute 'may not be the perfect remedy, [it]
cannot be faulted as unreasonable."'189 The court further held that
because other states had upheld scalping laws, the goal of section 25
of the ACAL, to protect the public against fraud, extortion,
exorbitant rates and similar abuses, was a legitimate interest of the
government that did not violate due process.190
The ticket broker's equal protection argument, that the law treated
various entities differently, was also rejected.191 Concert Connection
argued that because both promoters and brokers sell tickets, limiting
the maximum price at which one group can sell is unfairly
discriminatory. 92 In response, the court again cited Gold for its
holding that, although "the statute does distinguish between the resale
prices that may be charged by different classes of ticket sellers, it does
not distinguish within a given class." '193 The court thus asserted that
ticket brokers and promoters engage in fundamentally dissimilar
businesses such that different laws can be passed to govern each.
The value of Concert Connection lies in its reliance on Gold in
setting the threshold for not striking down section 25 of NY ACAL as
unconstitutionally discriminatory: "[A] person seeking to establish
discrimination must show that he belongs to the same class as those
allegedly receiving preferential treatment." '194 The defendant in
Concert Connection attempted to compare himself to promoters who
"impose a service charge that reflects 'special services' provided to
consumers in making tickets available." 195 Promoters are permitted to
charge these fees because, as quoted above in Gold, they "face the
competitive hazards of running a theatre, producing shows, and
making large capital investments." '96 New York's scalping law, the
court held, made a valid distinction between "those who would
lawfully recover their expenses and those who would gain substantial
profits from [the] unlawful reselling of tickets."' 97  Essentially, the
court found that selling a twenty dollar ticket for one hundred dollars,
a fifteen dollar ticket for forty-five dollars, and a twenty-two dollar
ticket for sixty-five dollars represented extortionate behavior on the
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817,821 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
190. Id. at 258-59.
191. Id. at 258.
192. Id. at 259.
193. Id. at 258 (citing Gold, 235 F. Supp. at 821).
194. Id. (quoting Gold, 235 F. Supp. at 821).
195. Id. (quoting N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aft. Law § 25.29[1] (1984)).
196. Id. at 259 (quoting Gold, 235 F. Supp. at 821).
197. Id. (quoting N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.01 (1984)).
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part of Concert Connection, behavior that a reputable promoter
would never emulate.
198
But what if promoters did the unthinkable and joined scalpers in
bringing in "substantial profits" instead of just "recovering their
expenses?" As this Note demonstrates in Part II.B., promoters are
now engaging in novel business practices to sell tickets at "substantial
profits," breaking down the fundamental distinction on which courts
uphold section 25 of NY ACAL and rendering it unconstitutional.
Therefore, Part III argues that because New York law prohibits
certain behavior when engaged in by scalpers but ignores the same
practices when carried out by promoters, the scalping law fails an
equal protection analysis and should be struck down.
B. Recent Developments in the Ticket Business
For forty years New York courts have upheld the constitutionality
of scalping prohibitions based on Gold's 1964 analysis of the
differences between promoters and scalpers. However, those
distinctions have since broken down. When the Gold Court
interpreted section 25 of NY ACAL, it differentiated promoters from
scalpers by focusing on the intrinsic qualities of promoters: They
invest large sums of money to run theaters and produce shows. 99 This
distinction made it easy for courts to hold that the law did not unfairly
discriminate between two similarly situated groups, as scalpers did not
have theaters to run or shows to produce. Today, however, it is
essential to look at more than the dictionary definition of promoters2 ' °
because their business practices now include intensive efforts to
capture consumer surplus for themselves, exactly the type of
"extortion" and "exorbitant rates" the scalping law seeks to forbid.
Part II.B. of this Note details how promoters have responded to
scalpers-as suggested by the Note's title-by themselves engaging in
scalper-like activities. Then in Part III, this Note explains why these
policies have eroded the constitutional rationalization of the New
York scalping law and argues that a law which treats similarly situated
groups differently is unconstitutional.
1. Chicago Cubs
In June 2002, Tribune Company, owners of the Chicago Cubs,
created a subsidiary called Wrigley Field2" 1 Premium Ticket Services
198. Id. at 256.
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. "Promoter" is defined as "One who organizes or actively supports a sporting
event, entertainment, etc., esp. for profit." 12 Oxford English Dictionary 617 (2d ed.
1989).
201. Wrigley Field, the Cubs' home stadium and one of baseball's smallest, oldest,
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("Premium"), a corporation that holds itself out as a ticket broker
unaffiliated with the Cubs. 2  The Cubs sold20 3 tickets to Premium
without ever making them available to the public through the box
office. 2°4 Premium then marked those prices up as much as thirty-
three times and resold the tickets on the secondary market.0 5
Premium sold $45 tickets for some of the team's most popular games,
including a rare interleague series between the Cubs and New York
Yankees, at $1,500 a seat.20 6 However, the Illinois scalping law
provides that it is unlawful for a corporation operating a baseball park
(or any other place of public entertainment) to sell tickets at any price
other than face value.2 °7 Therefore, the fact that Premium's president
was a Cubs vice president,20 8 that its offices-one block away from
Wrigley Field-are on land owned by the Cubs' parent company, and
that its books are kept by the Cubs' accounting department, seemed
to put Premium in violation of the law.2°
In addition to the operations of Premium raising Tribune
Company's revenues, the Cubs have also found a loophole in Major
League Baseball's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").2" The
CBA mandates that teams share thirty percent of ticket revenue
among all clubs. For each ticket the Cubs "sell" to Premium at box
office prices (say, $45), then sold at a markup (say, $1,500), the Cubs'
parent company keeps $436.50 that it would be forced to pay into the
revenue sharing pool had the Cubs' box office price been $1,500.211
Hence, the Tribune Company had a dual incentive to create Premium:
to reach market-clearing ticket prices and to bilk its competitors out
of revenue sharing funds.212
and most beloved parks, is filled to capacity each summer. See Doug Pappas, Boston
Baseball: Chicago's Official Scalpers (June 2003), available at
http://roadsidephotos.com/baseball/bb03-3.htm.
202. See Derek Zumsteg, Breaking Balls: Not-So-Fuzzy-Cubbies (May 22, 2003), at
http://premium.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=1924.
203. In fact, Premium never had to pay the Cubs with cash for the tickets. See text
accompanying notes 219-20.
204. See Greg Couch, A Textbook Case of Might vs. Right, Chi. Sun-Times, May 1,
2003, at 127.
205. Id.
206. Id. Allen Sanderson, a sports economist at the University of Chicago, said that
when other baseball owners hear of this, "they'll be mad at the Cubs, but also kicking
themselves for not thinking of it first." Id.
207. 720 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 375/1 (West 2003).
208. At least until a lawsuit was filed, at which time the Cubs hurried to make
changes to try to "look legal." See Greg Couch, Cubs Just Giving Fans the Business,
Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 17, 2003, at 103A.
209. See id.
210. See Couch, supra note 204.
211. Id.; see also Zumsteg, supra note 202.
212. This tactic parallels Courty's tax evasion example. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text. Best left for another time is the question of whether these
practices merit the termination of Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption.
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A class action lawsuit213 was filed on behalf of consumers alleging
that the Cubs had scalped almost 12,000 tickets through Premium, 214
that Premium was not a broker under Illinois law, that the Cubs were
involved in Premium's business practices, and that those who had
purchased tickets through Premium had suffered financial damage.2 5
Furthermore, the Illinois Attorney General weighed whether to file
criminal charges against the Cubs that could result in the forfeiture of
their license to put on a baseball game.2" 6
During the trial, plaintiffs argued that the Cubs and Premium were
one and the same, a direct violation of the scalping law.217 Premium
countered that it was Tribune Company, not the baseball team, that
set up the independent broker, although a witness for the defendants
could not explain why the legal fees in the case were on Premium's
books.211 Plaintiffs then questioned how a broker-presumably
independent from the Cubs-with an initial capital infusion of only
$1,000 could afford to purchase over $1 million in Cubs tickets for
resale.219 Defendants responded that this was a normal practice by
which the companies paid each other through Tribune's intercompany
account. 20  Defendants also claimed that Premium did not divert
tickets from fans because the tickets were taken from reserves meant
for VIPs.221 This meant that as the Cubs reached the National League
playoffs in 2003, Premium had no tickets to sell at a time when other
brokerages were the most active.222
The case was decided by a County Court in favor of the Cubs and
the brokerage. 223 The judge found that the Cubs gave Premium an
edge over other brokers. 24 However, the transactions between
Premium and the Cubs were held to be sales because there was a
213. See Cavoto v. Chi. Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., No 02 CH 18372 (Ill. Ch.
Nov. 24, 2003).
214. See Rovell, supra note 3.
215. See Zumsteg, supra note 202. The commissioner of baseball, Bud Selig, has
unsurprisingly remained silent about the questionable behavior of one of his fellow
team owners. Id.
216. See Greg Couch, Scalping Trial Puts Cubs in Precarious Position, Chi. Sun-
Times, Aug. 22, 2003, at 165.
217. See Couch, supra note 208.
218. See id.
219. See Greg Couch, People's Court Decision Is in: Cubs Are Guilty, Chi. Sun-
Times, Nov. 21, 2003, at 167.
220. See Couch, supra note 208.
221. See Rovell, supra note 3.
222. Id.
223. See Maureen O'Donnell, Cubs Prevail in Ticket Broker Case, Chi. Sun-Times,
Nov. 25, 2003, at 8.
224. See Cavoto v. Chi. Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., No. 02 CH 18372 (Ill. Ch.
Nov. 24, 2003). Specifically, for the Yankees series, purchases by individuals
(including brokers) were restricted to four tickets per transaction, while Premium
bought 1,755 tickets to the three games. Id. at 18-19.
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transfer of ownership for a price, even if that consideration only was
exchanged electronically in Tribune's intercompany accounts.22 The
judge also decided that the Cubs' generosity in allowing Premium to
return ninety percent of its unsold tickets did not prove that sales
never occurred. 26 The judge further ruled that the fact that Premium,
a presumably independent broker, was able to obtain the high-
demand seats227 reserved for VIPs and unavailable to the public, did
not necessitate a finding that the Cubs controlled Premium.228 In
effect, the judge ruled that under current Illinois law, common
ownership of a team and a brokerage is legal, and that it is up to the
legislature to enact limitations on that behavior.229  Thus recent
jurisprudence has permitted a team's owners to openly scalp the
team's tickets.
2. The Producers
In another highly publicized case of promoters maneuvering to
retain consumer surplus, the producers of The Producers Broadway
show began in 2001 to remove 50 of their best seats for each
performance until the day of the show. 23 ° They sold the normally $100
tickets to "Broadway Inner Circle," the brokerage they created, for
$400, which in turn marked the tickets up a legal 20%231 and resold
them to the public at $480.232
The promoters of the show did not hide that they were trying to get
a part of the secondary market, justifying the premiums as "a means
for high-paying customers to obtain good seats. ' 233 In response to
consumer backlash, The Producers donated for a short time $150 of
each ticket's price to the Twin Towers Fund, but continued to charge
nearly $500 per seat.3  Other promoters of Broadway shows
expressed both admiration for declaring this war on scalpers as well as
an interest in signing on to the campaign.23 5
225. Id. at 24.
226. Id. at 26.
227. Id. at 17.
228. Id. at 32.
229. See O'Donnell, supra note 223.
230. See Jesse McKinley, For the Asking, a $480 Seat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2001, at
Al.
231. See Elizabeth Block, Supplementary Practice Commentaries to Chapter 11-C,
Title G, Regulation of Sale of Theatre Tickets, in N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Ch. 11-C. A
2001 bill amended section 25.03(4) of NY ACAL, which sets forth the maximum
premium price at which a ticket can be resold, increasing that price from $5 and 10%,
whichever is greater, to $5 and 20%, whichever is greater, above the face value of the
ticket. Id.
232. See McKinley, supra note 230.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Robin Pogrebin & Jesse McKinley, Mixed Notices for the $480 Ticket,
[Vol. 721200
NEW YORK'S SCALPING LAWS
There have been as many as ten23 6 Broadway shows selling VIP
tickets through Broadway Inner Circle at prices far above what their
own box offices charge.237 Still, The Producers continues to make the
most headlines with the program: Because Matthew Broderick and
Nathan Lane, The Producers' original leads, are returning to the
show, its promoters are now holding back 100 orchestra seats from the
1706-seat St. James Theater for sale at $480-only through Broadway
Inner Circle.2 38  Orchestra seats for New Year's Eve 2003 cost
$1,500.239 While this practice may "create[] animosity between your
average theatergoers and your high-class stiffs,"'24 it has created only
high profits for promoters.
3. Variable Pricing for Sports Events
As the Chicago Cubs and The Producers have demonstrated,
promoters have discovered the folly of charging less than market-
clearing prices for high-demand tickets. Sports teams are also heeding
Einav and Orbach's advice24 1 to charge different prices for different
goods. Variable ticket pricing is a simple strategy for charging more
for tickets when popular opponents come to town.242 Pricing is
determined based on variables such as the rivalry between the teams,
day of the week, and month of the year.243 The San Francisco Giants
baseball team knows that it is competing with ticket brokers and other
secondary market actors: "It might send the wrong signal to your
fans, that you are trying to squeeze the last dollar out of them, but the
scalpers by your stadium are doing exactly that."'2" This Giants
executive has justified his team operating as a scalper by saying that
scalpers charge more for popular games, so teams themselves should
be able to do the same thing.245
Given the immense popularity of the 100th matchup between
storied college football rivals like Ohio State and Michigan, for which
N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2001, at All.
236. Not counting The Producers in Los Angeles.
237. See http://www.broadwayinnercircle.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
238. See Matthew Braine, Two Stars Bring High Talent and Prices, at
http://thecelebritycafe.com/features/1044.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
239. See McKinley, supra note 4.
240. See Braine, supra note 238.
241. See supra Part I.C.3.
242. See Darren Rovell, Sports Fans Feel Pinch in Seat (Prices) (June 21, 2003), at
http://espn.go.con/sportsbusiness/s/2002/0621/1397693.html.
243. Id. Special events, like fireworks displays, also command higher ticket prices.
Id.
244. Id. The chief operating officer of the Giants, Larry Baer, acknowledged that
his team charges fans $1 to $5 more for games played Friday-Sunday, but believes
this ultimately holds down prices for season tickets. Id.
245. Id.
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even the 107,501-seat Michigan Stadium can sell out and tickets can
be scalped for five and six times face value, 6 promoters have begun
to realize that mimicking scalpers' practice of charging more when
demand rises is the way of the future.
4. Online Secondary Markets
Many sports teams have implemented "services" whereby season
ticket holders may sell their tickets online at prices at or above face
value.247 The service, usually a link from a team's website, is a profit
center for teams, which charge a fee to both buyers and sellers and
take a percentage of the resale price.2" Ticketmaster's version of the
service, TeamExchange, is used by seventeen professional and
collegiate teams, including Madison Square Garden's New York
Knicks, Rangers, and Liberty.249 These services appropriate and
improve upon scalpers' middleman function, allowing season ticket
holders who cannot attend games to (1) receive more than face value
for tickets, which scalpers rarely pay; (2) accomplish the transaction
from the convenience of their own home; and (3) pay promoters a
percentage of every transaction.2 10  The only problem is that this
process is exactly what the scalping statute prohibited: first, these
tickets are routinely sold for more than the 20% legal maximum; and,
second, teams using these services avoid that part of the law which
prohibits promoters from selling tickets at more than the printed face
value. Although the services' user agreements place the burden of
complying with state laws on users, they do not prevent illegal
transactions from taking place. 251  The only way teams using such
systems have avoided criminal liability is through a lack of
enforcement on the part of district attorneys.2
246. See Andy Gardiner, Michigan-Ohio State: Free Ticket (For a Price), USA
Today, Nov. 19, 2003, at 3C.
247. See Jim Caple, All Hail Ticket Scalpers!, available at:
http://espn.go.com/page2/s/caple/O10821.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
248. See Mulrean, supra note 2.
249. See Tom Di Nome, Hot Tickets, Hawked Legitimately Online, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 2003, at G8.
250. See Derek Zumsteg, Breaking Balls: Mariners 1 Million, Scalpers 1, Feb. 3,
2004 (describing Mariners Marketplace, a service provided on the team's website by
which ticket holders sell unwanted tickets to the team (for a fee), then the team
resells the tickets to consumers (for another fee)), at
http://premium.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=2537.
251. See Mulrean, supra note 2.
252. See Robert E. Freeman & Daniel Gati, Internet Ticket Scalping: If You Can't
Beat 'em, Join 'em, Ent. & Sports Law., Fall 2003, at 6. This Note was titled
independently months before discovering Freeman & Gati's article, but the authors'
sentiment is shared: If legal action is not pursued against these teams, promoters "will
have successfully joined the very group of people they have tried to eliminate since
the early 1900s." Id. at 8.
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5. Ticketmaster's Online Auction System
In another important development, America's largest ticket seller,
Ticketmaster, is set to begin auctioning the best tickets to events
through its own website.253 Promoters are thus not only abandoning
the practice of charging "uniform prices for differentiated goods,,
254
they have moved directly into the realm of price discrimination-
selling the same product at different prices depending on the buyers'
willingness to pay more or less.255  Further, Ticketmaster is price
discriminating by only placing the best seats at a given event on the
auction block, putting to rest consumers' hopes that even tickets to
undesirable events could be had for less than the fictional "face
value. '256 For events at which scalpers operate, it is a truism that even
the least expensive seats were underpriced, so auctions would only
increase promoters' profits at those events. However, at less popular
events, where a sold out venue is not imminent, a moderate fan of the
performer might not be willing to pay full price for the worst seat, say
$50, but would be willing to pay below face value for a ticket through
an auction. If that fan's highest bid-the fan's reservation price-is
$20 and nobody bids higher on that given seat, the fan will be able to
attend for $30 less than the "face value" of the ticket. Ticketmaster
thus realizes that for events that are not guaranteed sellouts, the
auction method should only be used for the seats that are always in
high demand-the best ones. By restricting auctions to only the best
seats, Ticketmaster is price discriminating against the most rabid fans
who will bid up front row seats, but forcing everyone else to pay
Ticketmaster's price for nosebleed sections.
Amazingly, given their brazen acceptance of other means of price
increases, some promoters are frightened of consumer reaction to
such a plan. The vice president of ticket sales at the Pepsi Center,
home to the Denver Nuggets, Colorado Avalanche, and many
concerts, said that auctioning tickets is "extortion of fans.,
257
Whether promoters do not want to risk the "embarrassing situation"
of having seats in virtually the same location sell for significantly
different amounts or whether they really believe they are "gouging
253. See Chris Nelson, Ticketmaster Auction Will Let Highest Bidder Set Concert
Prices, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2003, at C6.
254. See Einav & Orbach, supra note 46, at 1.
255. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 99.
256. See Rex Moore, Ticketmaster Going Once..., at
http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2003/commentaryO3O9l0rm.htm (last visited
Jan. 25, 2004).
257. See Russell Adams, Ticket Auction? Wait and See: Teams Reluctant to Let
Ticketmaster Auction Best Inventory; Risks Cited (Sept. 8, 2003), at
http://www.stubhub.com/sites/corpsite/?gSec=news&gAct=news&article=090803a.
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fans," most teams are taking a wait-and-see approach to auctions.2 18
Given promoters' willingness to implement the profitable strategies
described above, it is likely that, as with all of Broadway following
The Producers, once one team shows that auctions work, the rest will
jump on the bandwagon. 9
6. Other Strategies
Although the last few years have seen an explosion in promoter
efforts to retain consumer surplus, other strategies have flown under
the radar for years. As mentioned above, sports teams provide season
ticket holders the opportunity to purchase those same seats for the
playoffs. 2'°  Teams require consumers to pay increased prices for
playoff games because there is more demand for those tickets.
Additionally, teams require season ticket holders to pay for every
possible playoff game-ten games or more-in advance, but, rather
than refund the price of unused tickets, teams simply credit fans'
season ticket accounts for the following year. Thus promoters earn
interest-free loans on the backs of season ticket holders,2' 6 a practice
that is considered a respectable way of doing business.
Promoters know that season tickets-seats that are never available
through the box office-often end up in the hands of scalpers who
plan to resell them. Promoters implicitly endorse this practice by
preemptively charging season ticket holders a fee known as a
"Personal Seat License" simply to have the right to purchase season
tickets.262 Scalpers have no problem paying because even with the
added cost-climbing at some venues to as high as $5,400 per seat 263-
they will still make a profit. Consumers, however, must pay this
surcharge because it is the only way for them to buy season tickets. 264
One of North America's leading concert promoters, Toronto-based
Concert Productions International, employs a plan similar to sports
teams' personal seat licenses. 265 For a flat annual fee on top of the
price for individual tickets, individuals can purchase the best seats
258. Id.
259. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Part I.D.3.
261. See Greg Couch, Cubs' Ticket Scam of '03 Looks Very Familiar, Chi. Sun-
Times, Sept. 11, 2003, at 135. Couch estimated that a team that sells 15,300 season
tickets can extract from fans a $10.2 million interest-free loan for four months. Id.
262. See Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They
Economically Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U.
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 483, 503 (2002) (explaining how a city can negotiate a favorable
financial deal to build a sports stadium).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 504 (describing wealthy patrons' additional option of purchasing an
entire luxury suite).
265. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 282.
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before they go on sale to the public.266 Most of these fees are paid by
scalpers,267 likely because very few consumers have an interest in
attending an entire year's worth of concerts. Many fans complain
about the fact that they have to pay promoters a fee for the privilege
of buying their tickets. Again, the law does not consider this practice
extortionate behavior on the part of promoters, but simply another
way of bringing in revenues.
With season tickets in such high demand, especially for football
teams that have fewer than a dozen home games a year, promoters
have begun to exploit fans' desire to obtain season tickets. The
waiting list to purchase New York Jets season tickets is approximately
ten to fifteen years long.2 8 The Jets are now charging fans $50 a year
simply for a place on the list.269 Originally the team's plan was to
pocket these fees, but when consumer groups and the Attorney
General expressed concern, the Jets agreed to apply the fees, which
will be capped at $500, to the purchase of season tickets once a fan
reaches the top of the list.27° More than 15,000 fans are now paying
solely for the privilege of waiting on line.271 When they get to the
front of the line, they will pay promoters another fee-the personal
seat license-for the privilege of buying tickets. Then the fans will
pay whatever price the promoter sets for those tickets. This remains
legal under New York's scalping law.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Traditionally, promoters sold theater and sports tickets at prices far
below market clearing levels, allowing scalpers to engage in arbitrage
to capture consumer surplus. 272 But with the rise of the Internet, with
its facility for bringing together ticket buyers and sellers, the barriers
to entry onto the secondary market were effectively lifted. Modern
promoters thus have little compunction about behaving in the same
way as thousands of registered eBay users. The economic discussion
of scalping in Part I was not included to change the reader's negative
opinion of the people who sell tickets on the secondary market. Nor
were the business practices of promoters described in Part II included
so that this Note could advocate criminalization of those strategies.
On the contrary, the first two sections of this Note were designed to
highlight the incongruence between what is forbidden to scalpers but
266. Id. In 1991 the fee was $500 for two tickets. Id. at 282 n.8.
267. Id.
268. See Jeane Macintosh, Spitzer Sacks Jets Tix $cheme, N.Y. Post, Nov. 11, 2003,
at 19.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See supra Part I.
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permitted to promoters. This marginalization of one section of a class
of businesspeople is an inequitable application of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
273
The New York scalping law is unconstitutional because it both
deprives individuals of their property rights without due process and
treats similarly situated parties differently.
A. Due Process
In Nebbia v. New York,274 the Supreme Court held that due process
requires that laws "not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected ... have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be obtained.'2 75  The rational relationship test is
extremely deferential to legislatures. However, the New York
legislature's goals276 bear, at best, an immaterial relation to the means
proposed to achieve them. This Note next explains how scalping does
not, as argued by the legislature, harm consumers.
1. Scalping as Harm
Having described how promoters surrender profits by underpricing
tickets and how scalpers acquire tickets for resale,277 this section
discusses whom, if anyone, scalping harms. The range of commentary
includes those who consider scalpers "unethical" and "domineering"
criminals who perpetrate "rampant abuses" on consumers 278 such that
federal legislation is required to stop them. 279 One author believes
scalping to be an unfair trade practice that states can regulate under
existing laws.8 ° Still others regard scalping as an activity that creates
273. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
274. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
275. Id. at 525.
276. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part I.
278. See Sheree Rabe, Ticket Scalping: Free Market Mirage, 19 Am. J. Crim. L. 57,
68-69 (1991) (condemning scalpers as unethical and domineering for extorting the
public, and demanding federal anti-scalping legislation to protect citizens from
scalpers' interference with the free market).
279. Id.; see also Paul J. Criscuolo, Reassessing the Ticket Scalping Dispute: The
Application, Effects and Criticisms of Current Anti-Scalping Legislation, 5 Seton Hall
J. Sport L. 189, 220-21 (1995). "In short, the problems associated with ticket scalping
require the need for comprehensive action on a national scale." Id.
280. See Thomas A. Diamond, Ticket Scalping: A New Look at an Old Problem, 37
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both benefits and problems such that existing laws are overbroad.28'
Tishler's theory is that the legal system does not need to protect
consumers, who benefit from transactions with scalpers,8 but that it
should safeguard promoters, whose practice of creating goodwill by
intentional underpricing is defeated by scalping.283 Tishler is correct
that consumers mostly benefit from the secondary market, though this
Note disputes his contention that promoters need protection.
a. Harms to Consumers
Views on scalping's impact on consumers fall into one of two
camps.2 8" The first camp believes that scalpers foreclose the public's
opportunity to purchase tickets at low box office prices and
unreasonably raise prices to extortionate levels.28 5  This is the
viewpoint from which anti-scalping legislation is enacted.286 The
second view is that scalping is "capitalism at its purest level. ' 21 7 From
this perspective, the scalper is "a humble businessperson and a fan's
best friend. 288  Neither of these extreme positions adequately
illustrates how scalpers affect the market.289
The most prevalent argument against scalping is that it deprives
individuals of the ability to attend an event if they cannot afford
scalpers' high prices.29 ' This wrongly assumes that all consumers
would be able to obtain tickets at box office prices if scalpers did not
intrude.29' Were this true, the box office price would be the same as
the market clearing price, and there would be no way for scalpers to
make a profit.292 As Tishler states, "[w]herever scalpers can earn
'exorbitant prices,' there would be in the absence of a resale market a
substantial number of consumers who could not obtain a ticket at the
box office, or any other, price. ' 293 Picture this scenario where scalping
does not exist: An event to which 60,000 people want tickets goes on
U. Miami L. Rev. 71, 88-92 (1982). Diamond believes that if scalpers were not
present, all consumers would have access to tickets at uniform prices. Id. Thus, he
believes scalping should be prosecuted as an unfair trade practice. Id.
281. See Happel & Jennings, supra note 47, at 14; see also Pukier, supra note 38, at
300.
282. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 114.
283. See id. at 118.
284. Id. at 108-09.
285. See id.; see also Diamond, supra note 280, at 78-79.
286. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 109; see also N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.01
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2004).
287. See Caple, supra note 247.
288. Id.
289. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 109.
290. See, e.g., Criscuolo, supra note 279, at 192.
291. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 110.
292. See id.
293. Id.
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sale at a venue with 50,000 seats. Recall that promoters prevent the
public from purchasing as many as one-fourth of the tickets from the
box office in favor of season ticket holders, VIPs, and to engage in
"ice." No matter how the remainder of the tickets are distributed,
more than 10,000 people will be unable to attend. Scalpers make it
possible for at least a portion of those people-those who value
attendance most highly-to attend the event.
Another facet to this anti-scalping argument is that scalpers
monopolize the marketplace by removing the supply of tickets from
the box office, thus enabling themselves to set exorbitant prices.294 On
the contrary, it is promoters that have complete control over prices
when scalpers do not enter the market.295 By creating a secondary
market, scalpers increase competition among all parties selling tickets
while at the same time increasing the convenience and accessibility of
tickets. This happens because scalping allows individuals to take
advantage of the income produced by their time and to still see the
event. Fans can also profit by waiting to buy from scalpers until the
event is about to begin, at which time scalpers risk losing their
investment if they do not sell at a price agreeable to consumers. 96
Critics of scalping often complain that the demand-based pricing
structure of the secondary market is "unfair" to consumers.297 This
sentiment is likely derived from consumers' belief that they are
entitled to consumer surplus.298 Tishler answered:
Where promoters choose not to reap the available profits, their
practice should not create an entitlement to receive the ticket at the
below market price. More importantly, their practices cannot
bestow such an entitlement on all consumers because some
consumers will necessarily be unable to obtain tickets at that price.
The law should leave the protection of irrational consumer
preferences to market participants who have a built-in incentive to
maintain goodwill. Where these market participants cannot protect
consumers against perceived harms, laws should not try to do so.
Such laws will necessarily be unjust to some consumers, and they are
likely to be ineffective in achieving their goals.299
Tishler viewed promoter underpricing as an attempt to curry
goodwill with consumers, a practice that hypothetically leads to long-
294. See Diamond, supra note 280, at 79.
295. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 110. See supra Part II.B. for a description of how
promoters are now asserting their monopoly power.
296. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 288 (explaining that scalpers can miscalculate the
demand for tickets, especially when a concert promoter announces a second show
after the tickets for the first have sold out).
297. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 280, at 85.
298. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 112; see also Pukier, supra note 38, at 292-93
(describing the research of Kahneman et al.).
299. Tishler, supra note 20, at 113-14.
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term profits. However, if promoters-those with the biggest
incentive-are unable to prevent the existence of a secondary ticket
market, laws that try to do so will be ineffective. Worse, anti-scalping
legislation will injure consumers who want to buy these tickets but do
not want to break the law.
Other harms to consumers include nuisance issues. Scalpers are
accused of congesting traffic by conducting transactions near exit
ramps and outside parking lots. Some complain that the "Who needs
tickets?" cry of scalpers looking for customers harasses other
patrons.3" Critics also cite the possibility that scalpers sell counterfeit
tickets as reasons to ban scalping entirely.3"' Although these are
legitimate state concerns, it is difficult to view these problems
seriously given the puzzling lack of enforcement. This especially
holds true if one accepts the argument "regarding the inevitable chaos
and disorder that results from the activities of scalpers."3 2  These
issues lend themselves more to regulation of scalping than an outright
ban.30 3 Courty, for example, cited an experiment by the city of
Phoenix which permitted scalping for the NBA All-Star Game, but
only in a designated area next to the venue where the game was to
take place.3°4
b. Harms to Promoters
In the preceding section, this Note contended that scalping should
not be viewed as a practice that injures consumers. Tishler writes that
we must not simply legalize resale for its consumer benefit, because
that ignores the supply side of the ticket market in which promoters
intentionally underprice. 30 5 Next, this Note examines his contention
that because scalpers directly undermine the business goals of
promoters, the promoters are entitled to legal protection.3 6
Because promoters most often support scalping prohibitions, they
300. Id.
301. Id. at 114; see also Bershad & Ensor, supra note 112, at 95 n.74 (describing the
intimidation tactics scalpers employ); Criscuolo, supra note 279, at 198-99 (describing
the congestion and danger that may arise from scalping); W. Zachary Malinowski,
Fate Frowns on Suspected Super Bowl Ticket Scalpers, Providence J., Feb. 6, 2004, at
Al (describing how two Boston men bought $2,800 tickets to the Super Bowl but
were turned away at the stadium's entrance because the tickets were counterfeit.
Luckily for the victims, the scalper, a Providence, Rhode Island resident, was on the
same flight back from Houston, where the victims pointed him out to police waiting at
the airport.)
302. Pukier, supra note 38, at 296.
303. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 114-15.
304. See Courty, supra note 14, at 175 (citing Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M.
Jennings, Herd Them Together and Scalp Them, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1995, at A14).
305. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 115.
306. See id. at 115-16.
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are seemingly the most likely victims of any harm scalping allegedly
causes. °7 A 1991 public debate over California's scalping law did not
include comments from either consumers or consumer groups.308
Similarly, when the New York State Legislature held hearings on an
extension to section 25 of NY ACAL, the Attorney General,
representatives of ticket brokers and theater owners-but not
consumers-presented facts and opinions.0 9  This absence of
representation suggests that despite the media portrayal of scalpers as
parasites on consumers, the public does not feel that scalping is such a
problem. The League of American Theaters and Producers cited "the
high cost of tickets and the availability of tickets [as] two issues which
continually inhibit increased attendance" at Broadway shows.310 This
research presumes that scalpers cause scarcity and high prices, leading
to smaller turnouts. However, promoters are not necessarily harmed
by the secondary ticket market. When scalpers obtain tickets from
consumers who can no longer use their tickets, the scalper acts solely
as a middleman, benefiting promoters in two ways.311 First, scalpers
transfer these tickets to consumers who will use them, increasing
attendance and thus the "hype" of attending a popular live event.312
Second, if these tickets went unused, promoters would not receive the
revenues associated with parking, refreshments, souvenirs, and other
concessions.313
Scalpers also have a more complementary financial relationship
with promoters than most people realize. Scalpers purchase blocks of
tickets to concerts, enabling promoters to count on a certain
percentage of up-front money to finance a show.3 14 Similarly, sports
promoters rely on season ticket purchases for much of their
revenue.315 Were it not for the market liquidity provided by scalpers
(in the sense that scalpers purchase most of their inventory from
season ticket holders who cannot attend a game and then resell to
fans without tickets), consumers would purchase fewer season ticket
packages, thereby lowering promoter revenues. 31 6 Next, the goodwill
argument for making ticket prices accessible to all fans is weakened
by promoters' practice of holding back the best seats in a venue for
307. See id. at 115-17.
308. See id. at 116.
309. See Kandel & Block, supra note 53, at 491.
310. Id. at 503.
311. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 289-90.
312. Id. at 290.
313. Id.
314. See Rabe, supra note 278, at 63.
315. Id.
316. Id.; see also Bershad & Ensor, supra note 112, at 91 (describing Ticketron and
the New Jersey Theatre Association's 1982 communication to the Attorney General
pressuring the state to remove the criminal sanctions from ticket scalping).
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those who can afford to buy an entire season's worth of tickets.317 It is
also likely that promoters enjoy the benefits of "ice": despite the
illegality of commercial bribery, there has been only one prosecution
under section 25.23 of NY ACAL in the last 35 years.31 8
Tishler argues that scalpers harm promoters because, by
underpricing tickets, promoters earn higher long-term profits;
"otherwise, we would not see below-market ticket prices as a stable
phenomenon. '319 As Part II.B. demonstrates, promoters of all kinds
of events are now setting ticket prices as high as the market will bear.
2. Due Process Analysis
New York's scalping law purports to prevent fraud, "the using of
false representations to obtain an unjust advantage or to injure the
rights or interests of another. '321 For the most part, scalping involves
no deception: Consumers understand that they are buying tickets
from an unauthorized reseller. They understand that they are paying
more than face value. Often they come armed with a computer
printout of the venue's seating chart so they know exactly which
tickets they are purchasing. Proponents of prohibiting scalping point
to the existence of fraudulent tickets, but scalpers have no more
incentive to incur the cost of counterfeiting than the promoter's
employees in the box office. In fact, scalpers have a strong
disincentive to sell fraudulent tickets, as their business, like any,
depends on their reputation to reliably provide the services offered.
If consumers who buy from a scalper are forbidden from entering a
venue because of phony tickets, that scalper will lose more business
from bad word-of-mouth than could be gained by preying on one
consumer.
Recall that the ticket resale industry is populated more by
corporate brokerages, which advertise and rely on establishing a
network of buyers and sellers, than by street-corner scalpers, who may
not have the same interest in maintaining their reputation. Although
scalpers might therefore have more incentive to counterfeit than
brokers, small-scale scalpers are unlikely to have the capital required
to produce credible forgeries, nor the capability to distribute them
widely enough to justify the investment. The danger of consumers
purchasing fraudulent tickets does not rise to a level that justifies-
and is thus not rationally related to-a price ceiling on ticket resale.
New York's law also purports to prevent extortion and exorbitant
317. See Pukier, supra note 38, at 294.
318. See Kandel & Block, supra note 53, at 506; see also supra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text.
319. See Tishler, supra note 20, at 117.
320. See 6 Oxford English Dictionary 152 (2d ed. 1989).
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prices, defined as "to overcharge. '3 21  Synonyms for "excessive"
include "Exceeding what is right, proportionate, or desirable. 3 22 As
explained above, consumers who buy tickets on the secondary market
are not acting unreasonably when they pay high prices. They receive
exactly what they pay for because their reasoning involves the
conscious decision that they are going to attend a given event no
matter the cost. Consumers who would rather have entertainment
tickets than their money are in no need of protection from the New
York State Legislature.
The "similar abuses" the law seeks to protect may be the congestion
and harassment of scalpers congregating near venues to sell tickets.
Even if these concerns are severe enough to merit legislative
attention-doubtful given scalpers' tiny presence among the
thousands of vendors, tailgaters, and fans at most events-a law that
prohibits selling tickets on the secondary market is not rationally
related to these harms. Rather, the scalping law is meant to protect
consumers from alleged fraud and extortion, not a crowd in front of a
stadium.
B. Equal Protection
Even if we accept the dubious premise that a law is needed to
protect consumers from price gouging, section 25 of NY ACAL would
still be unconstitutional. Unlike when Gold and even Concert
Connection were decided, this provision now unreasonably
discriminates between two groups engaging in identical business
practices.323 It is illogical to argue that marking up a $45 ticket to
$1,500, as does Wrigley Field Premium, or even a $100 ticket to $480,
as does The Producers, is a "reasonable profit" when it comes from a
promoter but extortionate price gouging when done by scalpers.
Scalpers are routinely accused of denying consumers access to
tickets at box office prices and reselling them for an unreasonable
profit. As the actions of the Chicago Cubs and The Producers have
shown, promoters are doing exactly the same thing. Mark McGuire,324
the original president of Premium and a vice-president of the Cubs,
said that the plan was to overcome the public relations blow of
owning Premium and then to contract with other Chicago sports
teams to scalp their tickets as well.325 The Cubs said that this "will
change the way ticketing is done in this country." '326 Jim Klenk, lead
321. See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 607 (2d ed. 1989).
322. Id. at 501.
323. See supra Part I.B.
324. The Cubs' president Mark McGuire should not be confused with Mark
McGwire, the retired All-Star first baseman.
325. See Couch, supra note 208.
326. Couch, supra note 219.
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counsel for Premium in the lawsuit, "was fond of saying that that's
how business is done in America today. '327 With the ascension of
Broadway Inner Circle and sports teams entering the secondary ticket
market, he seems exactly right. Klenk also said that the existence of
Premium actually made the resale market more competitive.328 On
the other hand, the Cubs' stated policy is to refuse ticket sales to
brokers.329
The existence of brokers either harms consumers or it does not.
The Cubs cannot have it both ways. Now that the Illinois court has
ruled it legal for the owners of the Cubs to hold back tickets,33° other
teams are likely to attempt the same thing. Further, if promoters
argue that they are making "reasonable" profits from ticket sales,
then extra charges like personal seat licenses-which go far beyond
the administrative costs that should already be factored into ticket
prices-are per se unreasonable. Moreover, Internet-auction-based
price discrimination and online secondary markets on team websites
are only electronic versions of a scalper's street corner business.
C. Consequences of Eliminating Section 25
If, as this Note suggests, the scalping law is struck down, the ticket
business will not devolve into chaos. On the contrary, eliminating
section 25 of NY ACAL will provide several positive results. First,
promoters will be forced to profit-maximize to the extent they are not
already doing so, which eliminates the income opportunity for
scalpers. By selling a $100 ticket for $480, the producers of The
Producers have appropriated $380 of consumer surplus. Scalpers may
be able to find individuals who value tickets at more than $500, but
not enough to maintain a regular business.
If, in line with Tishler's theory, promoters want to keep certain
ticket prices at below-market levels, they can protect themselves by
implementing more effective measures than a contractual provision
that forbids resale. Simple technological solutions include printing
barcodes that list the original purchaser's name when scanned or
storing a digital signature of purchasers and requiring a
countersignature for admission. Barcodes are already printed on
tickets to protect the promoter against accepting fraudulent tickets,
and digital signature devices are ubiquitous at supermarkets and retail
327. Id.
328. See Rovell, supra note 3.
329. See Couch, supra note 208.
330. See supra notes 213-29 and accompanying text. Notably, on January 30, 2004,
a ticket scalper in Seattle successfully challenged the enforcement of that city's
scalping law on equal protection grounds. See infra notes 335-60 and accompanying
text (Epilogue).
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stores. If promoters insist that there is goodwill to protect, a free
market, not the legislature, will force them to protect it.
Striking down section 25 does not preclude the legislature from
enacting new legislation to deal with legitimate harms to consumers.
The threat of fraudulent tickets has already been addressed by
promoters. But, if the legislature sees it as dangerous to consumers, a
scalping regulation might require that licensed brokers post a material
bond in the event a consumer is denied entrance on the basis of
tickets purchased from a scalper. If congestion at venues is deemed
an important consumer issue, the new regulation might include a
section like section 25.11 of NY ACAL, which prohibits sales of
tickets within 1,500 feet of a venue.33'
CONCLUSION
Striking down the scalping law is necessary. New York's Attorney
General believes it, too.332 According to Eliot Spitzer, "Consumers
will be better off if we deregulate scalping, let the market function and
get rid of the corruption in the box office." '333 When entertainment
tickets are resold for more than the box office price, it is because
promoters intentionally set prices below market levels and scalpers
capture the difference between the promoter's valuation and that of
consumers. Now that promoters have taken their own steps to
eliminate consumer surplus from the ticket market, legislation
prohibiting scalping is both unnecessary and unconstitutional.
EPILOGUE
Very recently, a ticket scalper in Seattle successfully challenged the
enforcement of that city's scalping law on the same equal protection
grounds this Note advocates.334
In Seattle v. Charlesworth,335 the defendant was arrested outside
SAFECO Field, the Seattle Mariners' home stadium, for offering to
sell baseball tickets above face value in violation of section 5.40.060 of
331. See N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 25.11 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2004).
332. See John Tierney, The Big City; Scalping Law Trims Wallets of Knick Fans,
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1999, at B1. Eliot Spitzer suggested, "Perhaps [promoters] could
eliminate the middleman... and auction off tickets on Ebay [sic] directly to
consumers." Id.
333. See Pogrebin & McKinley, supra note 235.
334. See Peter Lewis, Ticket Scalping Cases Tossed, Seattle Times, Jan. 31, 2004, at
Al.
335. Seattle v. Charlesworth, No. 420709, 430650, 428837, slip op. (Seattle Mun.
Court Jan. 30, 2004).
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the Seattle Municipal Code.336 The Mariners' website, however,
allowed season ticket holders to resell unwanted tickets at prices far
above face value, with the Mariners taking a 25% cut of each
transaction.337 Furthermore, the Mariners, in a concerted effort to
discourage street scalping in favor of their own secondary market,338
hired off-duty Seattle police officers and placed them under the
command of their Director of Security.339 Thus, employees of the
city-state actors-arrested and prosecuted street scalpers but
"prosecuted no cases based on ticket scalping from the website." '34
The defendant argued that the city's selective enforcement of its
scalping law was an equal protection violation, claiming, "(1)
disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals; (2) that the
disparate treatment [was] intentional, purposeful, or deliberate; (3)
and that it [was] based upon an arbitrary, capricious, or unjustifiable
standard., 34 1 Recall that to prevail on a rational basis test-where
courts presume the state actor behaved rationally and the burden of
proof falls upon the party challenging the law-is exceedingly
difficult. 342 The court held that the defendant satisfied his burden of
proof for all three elements, so this decision represents a significant
victory. First, the court found no "difference in legislative intent
between online scalpers and street level scalpers., 343 Because Seattle
receives the same tax revenue whether a ticket is first sold in person
or online, the court held street scalpers and online scalpers to be
similarly situated.344 Next, the court found the disparate treatment to
be intentional, purposeful and deliberate, citing the Mariners' hiring
of Seattle police officers to "buy tickets from scalpers for the purpose
of initiating prosecutions," '345 combined with the team and city's lack
of enforcement of the scalping ordinance for sales made through the
website." 6  Finally, the court held that "the legislative purpose in
enforcement and collection of tax revenue" necessitated a finding that
the city's selective enforcement is "based on an arbitrary
classification, not rationally related to [a] legitimate state interest., 347
Thus the defendant made a prima facie showing of a selective
336. Id. at 1. The statute provides, "It shall be unlawful for anyone.., to sell or
offer to sell an admission ticket or card at a price in excess of the price printed,
stamped or written thereon." Id. at 5.
337. Id. at 2; see also supra Part II.B.4.
338. See Zumsteg, supra note 250.
339. Charlesworth, slip op. at 3.
340. Id. at 4.
341. Id.
342. See text accompanying notes 188-89.
343. Charlesworth, slip op. at 6.
344. Id.
345. See id.
346. Id.
347. See id.
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enforcement violation of the Equal Protection Clause, overcoming
Nebbia's strong presumption that the state actor behaved
constitutionally.348
The court explicitly rejected the city's defenses to the equal
protection claim. First, Seattle was unable to convince the court that
the Mariners had a legitimate commercial interest in its ticket sales
such that scalping on the Mariners' website should be distinguished
from street level scalping.349 The court's finding on this issue is in
direct contradiction to the rationale in Kelly-Sullivan, where the New
York court stressed "the hazards of highly competitive enterprise and
the need for large capital investment" as reason enough to separate
promoters from scalpers.35°  The Charlesworth court correctly
recognized that scalping is scalping, whether it takes place on the
street or online, whether engaged in by individuals or by large
corporate promoters.
As an alternative defense, the city raised "the practical difficulties
of pursuing online offenders; in effect, the ease of enforcement"35' as a
permissible purpose for the disparate treatment. The judge held,
however, that the city had not made the permissible decision to
"deploy its resources in on[-]street activities rather than in online
investigations" '352 because it was the Mariners who had hired the off-
duty police officers rather than the city making this determination on
its own. This explanation might make it seem as though the Mariners'
involvement precluded Seattle from using the ease of enforcement
defense that would otherwise have absolved the city of wrongdoing.
However, the court implied that even had the Mariners not hired off-
duty police to enforce the scalping law, Seattle would still have been
found to have selectively enforced it: The court's factual findings
included a detailed description of the Seattle Police Department's
Intelligence Unit, which is "sophisticated in computer investigations
with the skill and training to determine what forensics are needed to
investigate scalping over the internet." '353 Also, because users of the
Mariners' scalping system "volunteered their private information,"
with buyers registering a name, address, user name, and password,
and sellers providing a credit card number in addition to the data they
already provided when they purchased season tickets,354 the court
likely would have rejected Seattle's claim that it is easier to enforce
street scalping than Internet scalping. Therefore, the city was not able
348. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
349. See Charlesworth, slip op. at 6.
350. Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. Moss, 39 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (App. Div. 1943).
351. Id. at 7.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 4.
354. Id. at 2.
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to demonstrate a permissible purpose for the classification of website
scalpers as legal and street scalpers as criminals.
The Cavoto and Charlesworth cases demonstrate that anti-scalping
legislation reflects an outdated reality, a time before promoters began
to sell tickets on the secondary market. The Cubs successfully
defended their lawsuit only on a technicality, namely that the baseball
team and Wrigley Field Premium were separate subsidiaries of
Tribune Company. This loophole allowed the court to hold that
because common ownership of a team and a brokerage was legal
under Illinois law, the Cubs had done nothing wrong. The Cavoto
case is being appealed, and angry fans are calling for new legislation
designed to force Tribune to close the doors of Wrigley Field
Premium. The Charlesworth case did not present a definitional
dilemma similar to the one in Chicago. Because a promoter was
clearly scalping its own tickets, the court correctly concluded that the
city could not prosecute scalping on the street level but ignore
scalping facilitated by a promoter's website.
This decision, although significant for the street scalpers who will
no longer fear prosecution, is unlikely to alter the current direction of
the ticket business: Promoters like the Mariners will not choose to
give up their own scalping simply to allow prosecution of street
scalpers by state actors. Promoters acting on the secondary market
have gained a valuable revenue source that was previously
unavailable only because they chose not to exploit it,355 and this new
profit center makes it doubtful we will see a return to the time when
promoters did not scalp their own tickets. Furthermore, fans will
prefer the convenience of promoters' online secondary markets to the
prospect of looking for tickets on the street, even considering
promoters' 25% fee.356 Promoters can also make the valid claim that
their service eliminates the risk of purchasing counterfeit tickets from
street scalpers because the only tickets sold on their websites come
from registered season ticket holders.
Importantly, promoters will not even take a public relations hit for
scalping tickets. This is because consumers appreciate the helpful
middleman function of scalpers-bringing together fans who no
longer want to attend an event with those who do. The public abhors
scalpers' profitable arbitrageur function that results in "unfair" high
ticket prices,357 without realizing that the two are intertwined. Fans'
outrage over the Cubs' scheme arose as a result of Tribune's
shameless plan to eliminate the middleman function by effectively
355. See supra Part I.C.4.
356. The fees charged by eBay do not seem to discourage the millions of secondary
ticket market transactions processed there. See supra notes 15, 28.
357. See text accompanying note 38.
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selling tickets to themselves. Despite the quote from the Cubs'
attorney that opens this Note,"' promoters in the future will probably
not make the same mistake when unveiling new promoter scalping
mechanisms. The final, and perhaps most significant reason
promoters are unlikely to give up their own scalping in favor of
prosecuting street scalpers is that by entering the secondary market,
promoters have appropriated such a high percentage of street
scalpers' revenue streams that street scalpers can no longer be viewed
as legitimate competitors, eliminating promoters' rationale for
advocating enforcement of scalping laws against street scalpers.
In addition to utilizing an equal protection argument in line with
the one advocated by this Note, the Charlesworth court also spoke to
the due process argument. The court heard testimony from a Seattle
detective that scalpers do not engage in "pedestrian interference,
harassment, assault or theft." '359 Fittingly, the court found that street
scalping does not pose a threat to fans: "Ticket scalping does not
prevent a safe and secure environment outside SAFECO field."3"
Because street scalping is not dangerous to consumers, who often
benefit from the transactions, there is no sound reason to prohibit it.
Because promoters engage in scalping of their own, any further
enforcement against street scalping while overlooking the scalping
efforts of promoters should be found unconstitutional.
358. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
359. Charlesworth, slip op. at 2.
360. Id. at 5.
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